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LONDON CALLING: DOES THE U.K.’S EXPERIENCE WITH
INDIVIDUAL TAXATION CLASH WITH THE U.S.’S
EXPECTATIONS?

STEPHANIE HUNTER MCMAHON*
ABSTRACT
The United States is one of the last countries to tax married couples jointly;
most other countries have adopted individual taxation. In 1990, the United
Kingdom completed transitioning its tax system from one that treated husbands
and wives as a marital unit to one that mandates an individual-based system,
and so it has two decades of experience with the new regime. This article
provides American policymakers valuable information regarding the
consequences of adopting individual taxation by examining the United
Kingdom’s experience. First, it establishes a matrix of factors that identifies
and assesses differences between the two nations that affect the predictive
value of the United Kingdom’s experience for the United States. The article
then reviews the origins and development of the United Kingdom’s original
mandatory joint return and the forces that drove the change to individual
taxation. Finally, it appraises the consequences of this revision of British law,
including the improved economic position of many wives and the increased
incidence of tax avoidance. Comparing the change in the United Kingdom
with what would likely occur in the United States, this article uses comparative
taxation to provide a guide for the United States, urging consideration of the
costs as well as the benefits of changing tax units.
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INTRODUCTION
Few would dispute that reinventing the wheel is generally a waste of time
and resources, but Americans often do just that when considering changes to
fiscal (and other) policies. While we as a nation sometimes analyze what has
already been tried in the United States (U.S.), we rarely examine what has been
undertaken abroad. This is unfortunate because some reforms currently being
proposed in the U.S. are similar to those that have already been adopted by
other countries. For example, the U.S. is one of the last countries to tax
married couples as marital units.1 In recent decades there has been a
worldwide movement, which many American academics join, in favor of
taxing spouses as individuals as a means of promoting gender equality.2 Most

1. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 60 (1997).
2. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., FUNDAMENTAL REFORM OF PERSONAL
INCOME TAX 54–56, 114–26 (OECD Tax Policy Studies No. 13, 2006) (discussing the effect of
an individual-based tax system on OECD member countries); EC Comm’n on Income Taxation
& Equal Treatment for Men & Women, Memorandum of 14 December 1984 Presented to the EC
Council, (COM (84) 695 final), reprinted in 39 BULL. INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 262, 265
(1985) [hereinafter EC Comm’n on Income Taxation] (noting that taxing individuals rather than
couples has the most gender-neutral effect); Cathal O’Donoghue & Holly Sutherland, Accounting
for the Family in European Economic Income Tax Systems, 23 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 565, 567–69
(1999) (discussing the traditional family model of taxation and its assumption that one spouse is
financially dependent upon the other). Among the dozens of articles by American scholars on
this topic, see generally ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND
THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 170–202 (2001)
(discussing the history of the American system’s rejection of separate tax returns and highlighting
its gender inequities); EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN (1997) (reviewing existing
proposals and recommending legislative changes to achieve gender neutrality); Boris I. Bittker,
Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389 (1975) (explaining how the
income tax should change to adapt to changing social norms and ideals); Grace Blumberg, Sexism
in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF.
L. REV. 49 (1972) (comparing American treatment of dual-earner couples with that of other
nations); Amy C. Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure: Identifying and Addressing the
Gendered Nature of the Tax Law, 13 J.L. & POL. 241 (1997) (exploring how income splitting and
aggregation harm women); Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in
Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1980) (arguing that a separate return system
is the best solution for eliminating disparities in tax treatment based on gender and marital status);
Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marriage Penalty: The Working Couple’s Dilemma, 47 FORDHAM L.
REV. 27 (1978) (noting separate returns would further feminist goals and solve taxation
disparities under the joint return system); Carolyn C. Jones, Split Income and Separate Spheres:
Tax Law and Gender Roles in the 1940s, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 259 (1988) (examining how
income splitting ideas from the 1940s underlie current tax policy); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love,
Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS
L.J. 63 (1993) (noting that women’s choice whether or not to work is affected by the current tax
structure); James Edward Maule, Tax and Marriage: Unhitching the Horse and the Carriage, 67
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of the American scholars who agree with this conclusion do so without
examining the many real world examples of this change in policy that can be
found outside America’s borders.3
Advocates of individual taxation expect it to help wives gain greater
equality within marriage because it eliminates the marriage penalty that results
from applying progressive tax rates to joint returns.4 When two individuals
marry and their two incomes are combined for calculating the taxes due, more
income is pushed into higher tax brackets, producing a larger collective tax
burden than would be due if the spouses had not married.5 As discussed more
fully later in this article, this penalty is thought to burden wives more heavily
than their husbands because wives’ income often is considered secondary to
the income earned by their mates.6 Eliminating this penalty is expected to
TAX NOTES 539 (1995) (arguing that to eliminate the “marriage penalty” altogether, a separate
return system must be used); Michael J. McIntyre & Oliver Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a
Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (1977) (arguing for taxing
individuals based on the benefit they receive from the family income); Shari Motro, A New “I
Do”: Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1509 (2006) (proposing that
only couples committed to actual income splitting be allowed to do so for tax purposes);
Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339 (1994) (examining the
behavioral impact on women of the current joint return structure); Lora Cicconi, Comment,
Competing Goals Amidst the “Opt-Out” Revolution: An Examination of Gender-Based Tax
Reform in Light of New Data on Female Labor Supply, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 257 (2006–2007)
(discussing the U.S. tax structure as an influence on educated women’s decision not to work);
Wendy Richards, Comment, An Analysis of Recent Tax Reforms from a Marital-Bias Perspective:
It is Time to Oust Marriage from the Tax Code, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 611 (2008) (arguing that
marriage bias in the tax code negatively affects both spouses and same-sex couples).
3. But see Norma Briggs, Individual Income Taxation and Social Benefits in Sweden, the
United Kingdom, and the U.S.A.: A Study of their Interrelationships on Lower-Income Couples
and Single Heads of Household, 39 BULL. INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 243 (1985)
(reviewing how the U.K., U.S., and Swedish tax systems treat women); Oliver Oldman & Ralph
Temple, Comparative Analysis of the Taxation of Married Persons, 12 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1960)
(examining how various nations tax married couples); Joseph A. Pechman & Gary V. Engelhardt,
The Income Tax Treatment of the Family: An International Perspective, 43 NAT’L TAX J. 1
(1990) (examining international efforts to reform taxes to account for family responsibilities);
Tonya Major Gauff, Comment, Eliminating the Secondary Earner Bias: Lessons from Malaysia,
the United Kingdom, and Ireland, 4 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 424 (2009) (examining the effects of
tax reform on dual-earner couples in various countries); Janet G. Stotsky, Gender Bias in Tax
System (Int’l Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Dep’t, Working Paper No. 96/99, 1996) (providing
examples of countries who have undertaken tax reform to reduce gender bias).
4. Leslie A. Whittington, updated by James Alm, Marriage Penalty, in THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION & TAX POLICY 251, 252 (Joseph J. Cordes et al. eds., 2d ed.
2005).
5. Zelenak, supra note 2, at 365–66. On the other hand, couples, generally those with a
primary earner, enjoy a marriage bonus of lower collective taxes because they benefit from larger
joint filing tax brackets or larger exemptions. See id. at 340–41, 364 n.113. As discussed in Part
III, some couples also enjoy bonuses with individual tax filing through tax planning.
6. Zelenak, supra note 2, at 365. See also infra Parts II, III.A.i.
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encourage wives to enter the paid labor market or for higher-income husbands
to shift property to their lower-income wives, in either case improving wives’
economic position within marriage.7
Before 1970, only six OECD member countries taxed spouses separately
which, by eliminating the combination of incomes, eliminated these marriage
penalties.8 The other countries shared the American system of taxing married
couples as a unit.9 By 1980, seven additional countries had adopted individual
taxation, and three more did so in 1989 and 1990.10 Because so many
countries have changed how they tax married couples, there are many
experiences the U.S. can study as it considers undertaking a similar change in
policy.
In 1990, the United Kingdom (U.K.) completed its transition from
imposing taxes on husbands and wives as a marital unit to taxing each spouse
as an individual, so it has two decades of experience with the new regime.11
Although the U.K. ought to be an obvious example for the U.S. if Congress
decides to change its tax unit, little research has been done in the U.S., or made
widely available to U.S. legal scholars, on the British transition.12 This article
fills this gap in knowledge as it evaluates behavioral responses to changing tax
units, using the U.K. as a case study, and it discusses the implications for the
U.S.
While this comparative method of learning from the experiences of one
nation and applying that knowledge in another is used relatively infrequently
by scholars, it has been used effectively in policy development. U.S. and U.K.
policymakers have both looked across the Atlantic before adopting changes to

7. See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 2, at 89–90; Christian, supra note 2, at 250; Gann, supra
note 2, at 32–46; Gerzog, supra note 2, 36–37; Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 109–11; Zelenak,
supra note 2, at 343; Richards, supra note 2, at 649–50.
8. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 1, at 59 app.A.
9. See id.
10. Id. at 59. Individual taxation is often limited to earnings. Id. In 1993, of 27 countries in
the OECD, 19 countries taxed earned income separately but taxed couples’ investment earnings
collectively. Id. The Czech Republic adopted joint filing in 2005 only for couples with children.
Jonathan R. Kesselman, Income Splitting and Joint Taxation of Couples: What’s Fair?, IRPP
CHOICES, Feb. 2008, at 3, 15.
11. Finance Act, 1988, c. 39, § 32 (Eng.). I have been asked why I did not use Canada as the
comparison country. Although Canada has been studied in preparation for this article, it did not
change tax units and so does not illustrate responses to change.
12. Economists have looked at the British transition’s impact on transfers of property within
the family. Melvin Stephens Jr. & Jennifer Ward-Batts, The Impact of Separate Taxation on the
Intra-Household Allocation of Assets: Evidence from the UK, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1989, 1990
(2004). See also ANN MUMFORD, TAX POLICY, WOMEN AND THE LAW: UK AND COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES 103–56 (2010). Mumford uses the move to individual taxation as her baseline and
argues that the subsequent shift to a child-centered system hurts women. Id. at 109.
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their tax systems.13 In the future, the U.S. should use this approach in a careful
and systematic way, focusing not only on what policies other countries have
tried but also on the intended and unintended consequences of these policies
and the likelihood of similar results in the U.S. As discussed in Part I of this
Article, this type of deep research into a foreign country and its laws requires
careful attention to the choice of comparison and a clear understanding of its
limits. This Article sets forth guidelines for assessing the usefulness of
international comparisons and what similarities two countries must have for
the policy experiences of one to offer useful insights to the other.
With the differences between the two taxing regimes in mind, Part II
explores how the U.K.’s approach to the tax unit evolved over time.
Beginning with a discussion of the early development of the British income
tax, this section examines why Parliament initially adopted a tax system that
required husbands to file returns and pay taxes for the married couple, what I
call husband taxation, and only incrementally recognized wives in the tax
system. Part II then evaluates how and why the British Parliament adopted
individual taxation or, as they call it, “independent taxation” in the Finance Act
of 1988 that took effect in 1990.14 The transition began in 1972 when
Parliament introduced limited, optional individual taxation, permitting wives to
file individual returns reporting their earned income and for taxes owed to be
calculated as though they were single persons.15 In 1988, Parliament went
further and denied married couples the option to file jointly by adopting
mandatory individual taxation.16 Part III evaluates the consequences, some of
which were unintended, of the U.K.’s adoption of individual taxation and
considers what guidance the British experience can provide American

13. One of the earliest, and possibly most important, comparative tax works is EDWIN R.A.
SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE OF INCOME
TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD (2d rev. ed., 1921). For additional examples of non-academic
comparative research in the policy context, see, for example, MARTIN DAUNTON, JUST TAXES:
THE POLITICS OF TAXATION IN BRITAIN, 1914–1979 214–15 (2002); ANN MUMFORD, TAXING
CULTURE: TOWARDS A THEORY OF TAX COLLECTION LAW 61 (2002); Steven A. Bank, The
Dividend Divide in Anglo-American Corporate Taxation, 30 J. CORP. L. 1, 3, 33–34 (2004); Ajay
K. Mehrotra, Lawyers, Guns, and Public Moneys: The U.S. Treasury, World War I, and the
Administration of the Modern Fiscal State, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 173, 212–13 (2010). See also
infra notes 123–27 and accompanying text.
14. Finance Act, 1988, c. 39, § 32 (Eng.). Individual taxation differs from individual filing.
Individual taxation calculates and imposes tax on each spouse separately. Individual filing
merely requires each spouse to file a separate return and denotes nothing about how the tax is
calculated. Therefore, individual taxation could be imposed but allow couples to file jointly
(saving paper), or the system could allow spouses to file individually but be taxed jointly. Most
proponents of individual filing in the U.S. also propose individual taxation.
15. See Finance Act, 1971, c. 68, § 23 (Eng.).
16. See Finance Act, 1988, c. 39, § 32 (Eng.).
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policymakers. In doing so, it examines the incentives and behavioral responses
created by individual taxation.
The Article concludes that the effects of the U.K.’s adoption of individual
taxation should provide a warning to the U.S. Adopting individual taxation
has created numerous unintended consequences in the U.K., and U.S.
policymakers should consider these before changing the tax unit.17 Even if
adopting individual taxation proves to be the best choice, all of its results, both
the good and the bad, need to be included in the political calculation. Looking
carefully at the British experience with individual taxation can offer American
policymakers invaluable guidance as they try to predict what the negative
results will be.
I. WHY THE U.K.? RULES AND REASON
Professor Mary Ann Glendon once wrote, “To many American lawyers, an
interest in other legal systems is something like an interest in wines: a little
knowledge about them is a sign of good taste and sophistication, but a serious
dedication may be evidence of waste, or luxury, or even worse.”18 This
attitude is caused by the often limited probative value of comparisons between
legal systems: Relatively few international comparisons can offer
policymakers meaningful practical insights into a particular issue.19 Possibly
for this reason, comparative tax studies often avoid applying concrete, specific
lessons from one country to another.20 Nevertheless, careful, informed
comparisons between tax systems can be highly instructive and may even help
policymakers shape policies that avoid the negative consequences other nations
have experienced.21

17. See infra Part III (describing how individual taxation both led to wives’ increased paid
employment and property ownership and also created significant government policing problems
due to new forms of tax avoidance).
18. Mary Ann Glendon, Why Cross Boundaries?, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 971, 972 (1996).
19. See, e.g., Pechman & Engelhardt, supra note 3, at 21–22 (noting that large differences in
the tax treatment of the family from country to country make it difficult to draw anything but
general conclusions).
20. See, e.g., Louise Dulude, Taxation of the Spouses: A Comparison of Canadian,
American, British, French and Swedish Law, 23 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 67, 127–28 (1985);
Pechman & Engelhardt, supra note 3, at 21–22. But see Edward D. Kleinbard, An American
Dual Income Tax: Nordic Precedents, 5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 41 (2010) (arguing for schedular
taxation based on evaluation of Nordic countries’ tax systems).
21. For a discussion of comparative taxation, see HUGH J. AULT ET AL., COMPARATIVE
INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS (3d ed. 2010) (offering comparative analysis of
different tax structures); MUMFORD, supra note 12 (examining tax collection culture in the U.S.
and U.K.); VICTOR THURONYI, COMPARATIVE TAX LAW (2003) (broadly discussing different tax
structures); William B. Barker, A Comparative Approach to Income Tax Law in the United
Kingdom and the United States, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 7 (1996) (comparing the tax evolution in
the U.S. and U.K.) [hereinafter Barker, Comparative Approach]; William B. Barker, Expanding
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Policymakers that want to take practical lessons regarding the income tax
from comparative tax studies need to ensure that they choose a comparison
nation whose culture, politics, economy, and legal and revenue systems are
similar to their own in certain fundamental ways. Although there will never be
a perfect comparison, in order to be able to assess the likely consequences of a
specific policy change the comparison should employ countries with key
factors in common and clearly acknowledge where the countries differ.22
Thus, broad threshold questions can eliminate many nations from
consideration. Is there a genuine rule of law in both countries, and how strong
are the legal institutions that regulate their income taxes? What are their
relative levels of economic development, and are these levels so different that
one can expect their income tax systems to differ accordingly? Is one or both
of the nations constrained by supranational organizations that limit its
individual sovereignty?
These threshold questions are easily answered for the nations under
review.23 Not only was the U.S. originally a colony of the U.K., but even after

the Study of Comparative Tax Law to Promote Democratic Policy: The Example of the Move to
Capital Gains Taxation in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 703 (2005)
(arguing that a comparative tax study should not be strictly theoretical but consider the nature of
legislation); John C. Chommie, Why Neglect Comparative Taxation?, 40 MINN. L. REV. 219
(1956) (suggesting more avenues for comparative tax studies); Carlo Garbarino, An Evolutionary
Approach to Comparative Taxation: Methods and Agenda for Research, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 677
(2009) (discussing methods of comparative taxation); Anthony C. Infanti, The Ethics of Tax
Cloning, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 251 (2003) (examining which ethical rules should apply to neutral
experts when advising developing countries to adopt Western tax structures); Michael A.
Livingston, From Milan to Mumbai, Changing in Tel Aviv: Reflections on Progressive Taxation
and “Progressive” Politics in a Globalized but Still Local World, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 555 (2006)
(undertaking a comparative analysis of the effects of tax progressivity) [hereinafter Livingston,
From Milan to Mumbai]; Michael A. Livingston, Law, Culture, and Anthropology: On the Hopes
and Limits of Comparative Tax, 18 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 119 (2005) (exploring the
potential for comparative tax study and why studies do not already exist); Omri Y. Marian, The
Discursive Failure in Comparative Tax Law, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 415 (2010) (examining existing
comparative tax scholarship); John Tiley, Judicial Anti-avoidance Doctrines: The US
Alternatives, 5 BRIT. TAX REV. 180 (1987) (considering introducing British general antiavoidance rules to the U.S.).
22. I disagree with Watson that “[v]ariations in the political, moral, social and economic
values which exist between any two societies” make it less worthy of drawing comparisons of
legal problems. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW
4–5 (1974). See also RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 15, 50–52 (6th ed.
1998) (arguing that legal comparison is a useful method of study). While this article begins with
a functionalist approach, one must examine the causes and effects of legal change with a critical
eye in order to draw normative conclusions about those changes’ consequences.
23. See Barker, Comparative Approach, supra note 21, at 8. However, the U.S. and U.K.
are not in the same tax family, and some scholars worry about their differing ideological
approaches. THURONYI, supra note 21, at 25–29; John Tiley, Judicial Anti-Avoidance Doctrines:
Corporations and Conclusions, 4 BRIT. TAX REV. 108, 143 (1988).
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gaining independence, the U.S. maintained legal and cultural ties with Britain.
Today, the U.K. and the U.S. are both wealthy, industrialized democracies with
common law backgrounds and robust, effective legal institutions, albeit with
important differences in their law and politics that will be discussed below.
Despite the U.K. being a member of the European Union, it retains substantial
discretion in devising its own tax system as does, of course, the U.S.24 Even
when the U.K. responds to political pressures exerted by the European
community, the British government must consider domestic reactions.25 The
U.S., on the other hand, has a federalist system that is likely to influence the
effectiveness of changes in federal law as states can respond to national
changes, as shown, for example, by states’ adoption of community property
laws to minimize federal taxes.26 Therefore, although the initial threshold
questions are met, there are important differences between the U.K. and the
U.S. that need to be considered further.
Digging deeper, both to determine whether this comparison is genuinely
worthwhile and to understand its limitations, we must look specifically at the
American and British income tax systems. This examination focuses on five
sets of questions. First, to what extent are both countries dependent upon the
revenue generated by the income tax? The more a nation relies on its income
tax, the stronger its interest will be in protecting its revenue-raising potential.
Because the U.S. is reliant upon the income tax as a source of revenue, if the
comparison country is not similarly dependent upon the income tax, the two
nations are likely to have different concerns and, consequently, make different
political choices.27 Like the U.S., the U.K. relies heavily on the income tax,
although the U.K. raises comparatively more revenue from internal taxes.28
Despite its value-added tax (VAT), the British income tax fluctuated between
11.7% and 10.1% of the U.K.’s gross domestic product (GDP) and 39% and
30.9% of its tax revenue between 1970 and 1990, when most of the legal
changes under review were adopted.29 In the U.S., if individual taxation were

24. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, TAX POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 5 (2000).
25. As discussed infra 18–20, the U.K. often used European arguments to further purely
local objectives.
26. See Stephanie Hunter McMahon, To Save State Residents: States’ Use of Community
Property and the Federal System of Government for Tax Reduction, 1939–1947, 27 LAW & HIST.
REV. 585 (2009).
27. FIN. MGMT. SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, COMBINED STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS,
OUTLAYS, AND BALANCES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 11 (2009), available at
http://www.fms.treas.gov/annualreport/index.html.
28. See FISCAL AFFAIRS DEP’T, INT’L MONETARY FUND, TAX POLICY HANDBOOK 289–94
(Parthasarathi Shome ed., 1995).
29. Id. By 2005, the income tax in the U.K. was down to 28% of revenue. OFFICE FOR
NAT’L STATISTICS, UK 2005: THE OFFICIAL YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT
BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND 365 (2004).
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to be adopted today, the income tax comprises less of American GDP, between
8% and 10%, but more of the government’s tax revenue, approximately 42%.30
Clearly, both nations rely on the income tax as a vital source of revenue, and so
both have a strong incentive to consider carefully how any proposed change to
the income tax would improve or worsen the tax’s effectiveness.
The second set of questions relate to the political process of producing tax
policy, as well as the resulting popular support for that policy. To what extent
do each country’s taxpayers and interest groups participate in the political
dialogue that shapes tax policy? After policy is made, how aware are people of
taxation, and how compliant are they in paying the tax? Despite their shared
dependency on the tax, there are significant differences between the two
countries under review in terms of the overall process of tax policy creation
and the public’s interest and involvement in that process. Unlike in the U.S.,
where tax policy typically develops in a complex, relatively public negotiation
process involving both the executive and legislative branches of government,
British policy development is more closed.31 A substantially final, complete
policy is designed by the British administration and then voted on (rather than
negotiated) by Parliament.32 Major British initiatives are often “announced in
the annual budget speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer as, in effect, fait
accompli.”33 This is changing in the U.K. as policies are more open for debate
but, compared with the U.S., the British executive retains the power over tax
policy.34
Not only does this British practice result in less overt interest group
pressure on the drafting of tax statutes, it has allowed the British government
to design a simpler regime than exists in the U.S.35 However, this lesser input
by interest groups does not mean British taxpayers are more satisfied, or more
compliant, with the resulting legislation. In fact, British taxpayers have a
lower morale about their tax system than do their American counterparts.36
30. See FIN. MGMT. SERV., supra note 27, at 11; FISCAL AFFAIRS DEP’T, supra note 28, at
289–94.
31. For an example of the U.S.’s process, see Jackie Calmes, Obama Weighing Broad
Overhaul for Income Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2010, at A1 (discussing negotiations between
Democrats, Republicans, and the President regarding tax changes).
32. See DAUNTON, supra note 13, at 18–22; David W. Williams, Taxing Statutes are Taxing
Statutes: The Interpretation of Revenue Legislation, 41 MOD. L. REV. 404, 405–06 (1978).
33. Michael Keen, Peculiar Institutions: A British Perspective on Tax Policy in the United
States, 50 NAT’L TAX J. 779, 795 (1997).
34. Id. at 795–97.
35. See MUMFORD, supra note 13, at 117–26. Although the complexity of the British
system has increased in recent years, it remains far less complex than the American system.
36. B. GUY PETERS, THE POLITICS OF TAXATION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 212–14
(1991); James Alm & Benno Torgler, Culture Differences and Tax Morale in the United States
and in Europe, 27 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 224, 239 fig.2 (2006). See also MUMFORD, supra note 13,
at 51 (stating that eliminating ignorance about the British tax system would increase confidence
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These differences in how the income tax is legislatively modified and how the
public perceives the tax will affect the value of comparisons between the
countries. Throughout this Article, the potential impact of these differences
will be highlighted.
Third, in order to judge a comparison of income tax policy, we must ask:
To what extent do the structure and practical administration of the two income
taxes differ? Because this Article focuses on behavioral responses, are the
differences substantial enough that we should expect similar policies to
produce different results in practice? Answering these questions requires
considering not only the general degree of complexity of the tax codes but also
far-ranging and very specific details of their operation. For example, how do
the countries define income? Do the variety and purpose of deductions differ?
And to what extent are the taxes collected at the source of income? The
answers to these questions reveal significant differences in the administration
of the American and British income taxes but ones that can be defined and
evaluated in the comparison process.
The U.K. has a schedular system of defining income in which the income
and deductions from different sources are separately assessed, whereas the
U.S. uses a global definition that combines all income and deductions in a
single calculation.37 One consequence that has evolved from these two
approaches is that the U.K. has a more limited concept of income based on
specific sources.38 This is distinct from the broader, American concept that
any realized increase in wealth is taxable income.39 This difference causes the
U.S. to be more inclusive when taxing income and the U.K. to be more limited
and formulaic. Both nations, however, provide favorable tax rates for
unearned income. In the U.S., capital gains rates are currently taxed at a
maximum of 15% and, in the U.K., the comparable rate is 18%.40 Both
countries, thus, favor some forms of income over others.
How the nations collect these taxes also differs. The British system
developed a pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) system instead of the American
withholding and self-assessment regime.41 The PAYE system tells taxpayers
how much they owe, and it calibrates the amounts withheld over the course of

in the system); William Gale, What Can America Learn from the British Tax System?, 18 FISCAL
STUD. 341, 351 (1997) (noting the British citizenry’s ignorance of their tax system).
37. I.R.C. §§ 61(a), 67–89 (2006); Comment, Some Techniques of Taxation in the United
Kingdom, 52 YALE L.J. 400, 400–02 (1943).
38. See THURONYI, supra note 21, at 236–37.
39. Id. at 232, 236.
40. I.R.C. § 1(h) (2006); Capital Gains Tax Rates and Annual Tax Free Allowances, HM
REVENUE & CUSTOMS, www.hmrc.gov.uk/rates/cgt.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
41. AULT ET AL., supra note 21, at 163. The U.K. has required more self-assessment since
1996. Id.; Gale, supra note 36, at 350; Victoria Curzon Price, The British Tax System: Opposing
Trends, 13 J. DES ECONOMISTES ET DES ETUDES HUMAINES 589, 592 (2003).
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the taxable year to ensure that refunds or payments, and therefore the filing of
tax returns, are generally not required.42 Only about 9.3 million people are
required to file a tax return in the U.K. each year.43 Thus, only about 35% of
British taxpayers, typically those who are self-employed or who have higher
incomes or investment income, are required to file income tax returns.44 In the
U.S., conversely, more than 100% of taxpayers are required to file.45
The PAYE system works, in large part, because the British income tax is
simpler than the American system, making self-assessment unnecessary in
most cases.46 In fact, simplicity in operation is an important policy goal in the
U.K.; while the U.S. claims to have such a goal, little has been done to achieve
it.47 There are many fewer deductions and fewer rate brackets in the British
income tax than in the American tax, and most British taxpayers are in one tax
bracket, making the system resemble a flat rate tax.48 In 2004, the latest year
for which data are available, there were an estimated 29.9 million individual
taxpayers in the U.K., of which only 3.4 million, or 11.4%, were not in the
20% bracket.49 These structural differences between the U.K. and the U.S. will
affect the impact of individual taxation, and the impact of these differences
will be discussed later in this Article.
Fourth, to what extent does the enforcement of the taxes differ? Because
simplicity is an important objective, the British income tax has less-developed

42. See Gale, supra note 36, at 347–50; Christopher C. Hood, British Tax Structure
Development as Administrative Adaptation, 18 POL’Y SCI. 3, 14 (1985).
43. OFFICE FOR NAT’L STATISTICS, supra note 29, at 372. This does not mean the PAYE
system is always accurate. One study notes at least 40% of taxpayers have incorrect codings.
MUMFORD, supra note 13, at 54 n.4.
44. See OFFICE FOR NAT’L STATISTICS, supra note 29, at 372. Approximately 17 out of 26
million British individual taxpayers had no need to file tax returns, and 50% of those who need to
file a return in the U.K. are self-employed. William J. Turnier, PAYE as an Alternative to an
Alternative Tax System, 23 VA. TAX REV. 205, 224 (2003).
45. Americans who are not taxpayers have to file income tax returns because the system is
also used to distribute government aid, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit. E.g., I.R.C. §
6012(a) (2006).
46. See Gale, supra note 36, at 348.
47. DAUNTON, supra note 13, at 360; Gale, supra note 36, at 348–50.
48. OFFICE FOR NAT’L STATISTICS, supra note 29, at 372–73; Gale, supra note 36, at 347–
48. There are three brackets in the British system, with 20%, 40%, and 50% rates. Finance Act
2010, c. 13, § 1 (Eng.). See also HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, BUDGET 2009: ADDITIONAL RATE
OF INCOME TAX AND INCOME-RELATED REDUCTION OF THE PERSONAL ALLOWANCE FROM
2010–11 1 (2009), available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/budget2009/bn01.pdf. There are also
special rates for savings income or ordinary dividends. Id. at 2. Income tax rates in the U.S. are
much more complex. I.R.C. § 1 (2006). The American alternative minimum tax with its flat tax
features eliminates many of these deductions. See I.R.C. §§ 67, 68.
49. OFFICE FOR NAT’L STATISTICS, supra note 29, at 372–73.
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anti-avoidance procedures than the U.S. has.50 Instead of the common law
doctrines and broad anti-avoidance legislation and regulations that U.S.
regulators use to pursue tax avoiders whose actions breach the spirit, but not
the letter, of the law, the British tax system demands that Parliament clearly
define the income it wants to tax.51 Therefore, British tax avoidance is largely
a test of statutory construction and, to a certain extent, form over substance.52
Taxpayers generally succeed in avoiding taxes if they structure their
transactions to gain favorable tax treatment under the literal language, if not
the intent, of the revenue statutes.53 As discussed more fully in Part III, this
difference in systems will have a definite effect on how effectively the
government can police avoidance-driven transfers between spouses.
Finally, to what extent is each nation’s income tax meant to further social
goals, or goals other than raising revenue? The U.S. has long incorporated
social policy goals in its tax code, for example through the adoption of
numerous deductions and credits that attempt to encourage charitable
donations, home ownership, secondary education, et cetera.54 While the U.K.
shares an understanding that the income tax can be used to implement social
policy, it has never attempted to do so to the extent that the U.S. does.55
Nevertheless, both nations generally share, and attempt to advance, the larger
social policy goal of taxing people according to their ability to pay taxes; and
both seek, within limits, to advance policies meant to achieve the dominant
political party’s vision of that end.56 For example, the adoption of individual
taxation in the U.K., as discussed in Part II, was not driven by revenue
objectives but by social ones of providing financial support to one-earner
families.57
The answers to these questions reveal important differences between the
British and American tax systems in their structure and administration, and
these differences will make comparisons of the income tax’s tax unit between
the U.K. and the U.S. less than perfect. However, these differences are a
50. HEATHER GETHING ET AL., HERBERT SMITH, GLEISS LUTZ, & STIBBE, A GENERAL
ANTI-AVOIDANCE RULE FOR THE UK—THE FINAL CONFESSION OF GOVERNMENTAL
INEPTITUDE? 2–4 (2010), available at http://www.herbertsmith.com/NR/rdonlyres/04BC669D20F7-4A4F-94E9-336A6D901397/0/8626_AntiAvoidanceRulebriefing_d4.pdf. For a discussion
of how British tax statutes are interpreted, see AULT ET AL., supra note 21, at 167–69, 205–08;
THURONYI, supra note 21, at 172–84; Caroline Garnham, Finance and the Family: The Pitfalls in
Tax Planning, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 9, 1993, at 10; Williams, supra note 32, at 408–17.
51. AULT ET AL., supra note 21, at 153, 167. A general anti-avoidance rule was proposed in
the 1990s but withdrawn. Id. at 169.
52. See id. at 167–69.
53. Id. at 166, 169.
54. Gale, supra note 36, at 348–49.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See infra notes 186–87 and accompanying text.
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matter of degree and not kind. If any comparison has value, these differences
can be addressed by appropriate sensitivity to how they might affect the
comparison. Moreover, for any comparison of a policy to be useful, it is
important to identify and understand the factors that might cause the
comparison to produce faulty advice and inaccurate predictions. Because the
U.K., but not the U.S., has changed its tax unit to date, this Article addresses
these questions by focusing on the actual experience in the U.K. and then
considering the ways in which the U.S. experience would likely differ if it
enacted a similar change.
This more narrow analysis of the specific policy must first ask: What were
the stated goals of the policy change as articulated by both the government and
various affected interest groups (recognizing that there are likely to be
inconsistencies between these statements)? In the context of this article, the
questions must be reframed to reflect the fact that the U.S. has not yet adopted
individual taxation: What were the stated goals of the change in the U.K., and
how would we expect those goals to differ if individual taxation was adopted
in the U.S.? As a corollary to these questions, to what extent has the change
achieved its stated goals?
Second, what impact has the change had on the operation of, and
compliance with, the income tax? Has the change encouraged tax planning
and tax avoidance? If a change in law significantly increases administrative
costs or causes a substantial amount of tax avoidance, those considering a
similar policy change should weigh that consequence against the change’s
benefits, both because governments are loath to spend money on tax
enforcement and because the creation of tax avoidance, particularly to the
extent it is visible to other taxpayers, might decrease compliance overall.58 If
there are factors that are likely to cause the administrative and compliance
effects of a policy change to differ in the two nations under consideration, the
comparison should identify them and weigh their likely impact.
Finally, what unintended consequences has the policy been shown to have?
These consequences can be good or bad; the labels of good or bad themselves
are socially constructed and, while society can agree on a few goals, many
more divide the public. Nonetheless, although different people draw different
normative conclusions about such consequences, identifying the unintended
consequences of a policy change is useful when evaluating the overall success
of the measure. Included in this group of concerns are the incentive effects of
a change in policy. What does the change in legislation cause people to do?
Although some incentives might be intended, that will not always be the case.
It should never be assumed that all policymakers and advocates intended to
create every incentive or even understood them.

58. See infra Part III.B.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2010]

LONDON CALLING

173

The remainder of this Article explores the answers to these questions in the
case of the U.K.’s adoption of individual taxation and what that experience can
tell American policymakers about the possible consequences of a similar
policy change in the U.S. Although there are reasons to expect that the
adoption of individual taxation by the U.S. would produce different results
than it has in the U.K., the purpose of the previous questions is to help us
predict when behavioral responses are likely to differ between counties.59 This
is not to suggest such a comparison will produce a perfect predictive guide.
The effects of any policy change are complex because of the interaction of
numerous political, social, and economic factors. Nonetheless, understanding
the U.K.’s change in its tax unit should help American policymakers anticipate
the behavioral responses of following in its footsteps.
II. THE HOW AND THE WHY OF CHANGE
The U.K. originally adopted the income tax in the midst of the nation’s
wars with revolutionary France.60 The tax was intended to raise much needed
revenue for the war effort at a time when tax administration was rudimentary.61
Consequently, administration was a significant concern; the tax’s impact on
wives was not.
This early tax adopted husband taxation to make
administration easier.62 By requiring husbands to file tax returns reporting not
only their income but also that of their wives, revenue was more easily raised.
Through the first century of the tax’s operation, the income tax all but ignored
the existence of British wives. It was only gradually that Parliament enacted
changes that granted wives rights and privileges within the tax system.63 The
pace of change began to accelerate in the 1970s and 1980s with the result that
the original system was jettisoned for a mandatory individual regime.64

59. This is pushing the analysis further than Livingston, who claims that political differences
will yield “indirect and unpredictable” results. Livingston, From Milan to Mumbai, supra note
21, at 583.
60. MARTIN DAUNTON, TRUSTING LEVIATHAN: THE POLITICS OF TAXATION IN BRITAIN,
1799–1914, at 32–57 (2001). For good descriptions of the early British income tax, see id. at 32–
57; see generally ARTHUR HOPE-JONES, INCOME TAX IN THE NAPOLEONIC WARS (1939); B.E.V.
SABINE, A HISTORY OF INCOME TAX (1966); Meade Emory, The Early English Income Tax: A
Heritage for the Contemporary, 9 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 286 (1965).
61. SABINE, supra note 60, at 26–27; Emory, supra note 60, at 288–89.
62. See ROYAL COMM’N ON THE TAXATION OF PROFITS & INCOME, SECOND REPORT, 1954,
[cmd.] 9105, at 36 (U.K.) (noting that the treating husband and wife as one unit was easiest); but
see Dulude, supra note 20, at 76 (noting the joint tax was instituted because women were thought
to be servile to men).
63. See Dulude, supra note 20, at 76–79.
64. Finance Act 1988, c. 39, § 32 (U.K.); Dulude, supra note 20, at 77–79.
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The Early Years

By the end of the seventeenth century, the House of Commons had taken
from the king his prerogative of economic regulation.65 New political leaders,
like Prime Minister William Pitt, held that power largely as a result of their
financial acumen.66 They were entrusted with the task of raising money even
as war with France called attention to the incapacities of the British fiscal
system.67 Earlier revenue measures’ susceptibility to evasion and their general
unreliability forced Pitt to propose a new tax levied directly on income.68 A
significant concern for those drafting this income tax was how to minimize its
avoidance.69 They recognized that there would always be some avoidance and
evasion, but they sought to confine the abuse within reasonable limits.70 As a
result, when, in 1798, they imposed a tax on a person’s entire income, the
person was not every individual but every non-married person and every
husband.71 Families were not to be a means of tax avoidance; couples were
prohibited from reducing their taxes through the shifting of income to a lowertaxed spouse.72
Husband taxation was also a natural choice of tax units because it
“afforded a convenient means of collecting the tax, more especially as the
husband was a necessary party to any suit against his wife at common law.”73
At the time of the British tax’s enactment, coverture denied British wives legal
recognition as separate individuals from their husbands for most legal
purposes.74 From the early thirteenth century until the second half of the
nineteenth century, English common law held that most of the property a wife
owned as feme sole came under the control of her husband at the time of their

65.
66.
67.
68.

SABINE, supra note 60, at 14.
Id.
Id.; SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 62.
34 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND col. 4–5 (London, T.C. Hansard 1819);
SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 72–73.
69. 34 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND, supra note 68, col. 1152.
70. Id. col. 5.
71. Act of 1799, 39 Geo. 3, c. 41 (repealed 1816). The tax form specifically required
husbands to include their wives’ separate property. Id. c. 41. In 1803, a provision was added
allowing wives acting as sole traders who did not live with their husbands to file separately. An
Act for Granting to his Majesty, Until the Sixth Day of May Next After the Ratification of
Definitive Treaty of Peace, a Contribution on the Profits Arising from Property, Professions,
Trades, and Offices, 1803, 43 Geo. 3, c. 122, § 91, sch. D.
72. See SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 103.
73. ROYAL COMM’N ON THE TAXATION OF PROFITS & INCOME, supra note 62, at 36.
74. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 550–51 (3d ed. 1990); 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A FACSIMILE OF THE
FIRST EDITION OF 1765–1769 430 (University of Chicago Press, 1979); Mary Beth Combs, “A
Measure of Legal Independence”: The 1870 Married Women’s Property Act and the Portfolio
Allocations of British Wives, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 1028, 1032 (2005).
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marriage.75 While this was the general law of coverture, it did not apply in
practice to wives of the wealthiest families or, as recent studies have shown,
necessarily to any group of wives.76 Wives along the income spectrum found
means to preserve their separate property, owning and, more importantly,
controlling that property.77 A wife’s separate property, for example if held in
trust, could not be reached by her husband or by her husband’s creditors.78
This economic reality sheds light on how coverture functioned in practice:
It was a legal fiction regulating the relationship between society and the family
more than an expected condition of marital relations. In other words,
outsiders, and particularly the government, generally dealt with one member of
the family even if within the family there were multiple decision-makers.79
Under coverture, this one member was the husband. The British income tax
continued the traditional coverture model, requiring HM Revenue & Customs
(HMRC), at the time called Inland Revenue,80 to collect only from husbands,
even though husbands who paid significant income tax would likely have had
wives with separate income beyond their husbands’ reach on which they had to
pay tax.81
Thus, husband taxation required that husbands pay tax on income that they
neither owned nor controlled. Moreover, while husbands were legally
responsible for reporting all of the couple’s income, there was no means for
legally compelling a wife to inform her husband of her sources or amount of
income.82 It is surprising that wealthy men, likely some in Parliament, did not

75. 1 LAWS RESPECTING WOMEN 151 (Oceana Publ’ns, Inc. 1974) (1777); see also BAKER,
supra note 74, at 552.
76. Margot Finn, Women, Consumption and Coverture in England, c.1760–1860, 39 HIST. J.
703, 705–06 (1996).
77. BAKER, supra note 74, at 552–53; AMY LOUISE ERICKSON, WOMEN AND PROPERTY IN
EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 150–51 (1993); R.J. MORRIS, MEN, WOMEN AND PROPERTY IN
ENGLAND, 1780–1870: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY OF FAMILY STRATEGIES AMONGST
THE LEEDS MIDDLE CLASSES 233–38 (2005); TIM STRETTON, WOMEN WAGING LAW IN
ELIZABETHAN ENGLAND 26–27, 119–23 (1998); Finn, supra note 76, at 705–06; Joanne Bailey,
Comment, Favoured or Oppressed? Married Women, Property and ‘Coverture’ in England,
1660–1800, 17 CONTINUITY & CHANGE 351, 363–66 (2002).
78. Combs, supra note 74, at 1032–33 n.20.
79. EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMM’N, INCOME TAX & SEX DISCRIMINATION 7 (1978).
80. I have used HMRC throughout this article for consistency.
81. See ROYAL COMM’N ON THE TAXATION OF PROFITS & INCOME, supra note 62, at 36
(explaining how a husband would still be liable for a wife’s earned income and investment
income). It is beyond the scope of this article to examine early income tax records and trust and
probate records to see how many husbands, in fact, paid tax on their wives’ income. Although
much of wives’ property likely did not produce income, that was by no means always the case.
MORRIS, supra note 77, at 254–63 (detailing the flow of income from womens’ trusts).
82. EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMM’N, supra note 79, at 22. For at least one case in which a
husband was jailed because he could not obtain information of his wife’s income, see 64 PARL.
DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1914) 2017.
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draft the statute so that it taxed each spouse as an individual. This would have
decreased their tax burdens and eliminated the situation of husbands being
taxed on someone else’s property. That they did not draft the law this way
likely meant either: 1) Wives’ trusts and other separate property meant little in
practice, and husbands still felt they owned their wives’ separate property; or
2) It seemed equitable to tax the couple on its combined income, as if their
shared interests as a couple overrode the spouses’ separate economic interests
for purposes of taxation.83 Regardless of which view prevailed, the first
modern income tax taxed couples as a unit.
At the same time that the British income tax was proving that it could raise
revenue, the women’s movement began to win statutory advances in the law.84
The Married Woman’s Property Acts of 1870 and 1882 gave wives the right to
own and control most forms of personal property as well as rights to their
earnings.85 One scholar has seen these acts as the “greatest transfer of
resources from married men to married women which has ever taken place.”86
As these legal changes were altering the ownership of property within families,
husbands continued to be responsible for the tax due on their wives’ income,
and husbands did not lobby to change this system.87 Indeed, in the nineteenth
century, “the principle of aggregation raised no issue of major importance.”88
Then, in the late nineteenth century, women, not their husbands, made
individual filing, if not individual taxation, an important and recurrent issue as
part of the women’s rights movement.89
In time, Parliament began to recognize wives in the tax system, first by
granting them their own exemption, or “allowance” as they are called in the
U.K.90 Previously, Parliament had given some married couples an additional
exemption, the married man’s allowance (MMA), only if the wife engaged in
paid employment.91 Although this meant that husbands already had larger

83. The latter position might also reflect the fact that tax rates were low.
84. For a discussion of the movement, see JAN PAHL, MONEY AND MARRIAGE 19–22
(1989).
85. Married Women’s Property Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 93 (Eng.); Married Women’s
Property Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., c. 75 (Eng.); see also PAHL, supra note 84, at 21–22.
86. PAHL, supra note 84, at 22.
87. Id. at 19–20.
88. ROYAL COMM’N ON THE TAXATION OF PROFITS & INCOME, supra note 62, at 36.
89. G.P. Marshall & A.J. Walsh, Marital Status and Variations in Income Tax Burdens, 4
BRIT. TAX REV. 236, 237 (1970).
90. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N ON THE INCOME TAX, 1920, [Cmd.] 615, at 56–57
(U.K.) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N]. An exemption is an amount of income not
subject to tax. See I.R.C. § 151(a) (2006). I will call British allowances “exemptions” for the
convenience of my audience.
91. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N, supra note 90, at 56–57 (describing the married man’s
allowance). After World War I, the husband received the MMA whether or not his wife engaged
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exemptions than single taxpayers who received a single person’s allowance
(SPA), Parliament enacted an additional wife’s earned income allowance
(WEIA) that offset wives’ wage income, income still reported by their
husbands.92 As the following chart shows, while a wife lost the SPA she had
as an unmarried woman when she married, if she had earned income it was
offset by the WEIA.93 Because the SPA offset both unearned and earned
income and the WEIA offset only earned income, the WEIA effectively
reallocated the tax burden from earned to unearned income.94
British Pre-1990 Exemptions
SINGLE
Earned
Unearned
Income
Income
WOMAN

Single Person Allowance
(SPA)

MAN

Single Person Allowance
(SPA)

MARRIED
Earned Income
Unearned
Income
Wife’s Earned
Income
Allowance
(WEIA)

N/A

Married Man Allowance (MMA)

In 1914, Parliament further extended recognition to wives by giving them
the option of separate filing.95 Thereafter, wives could file individual returns.
While this gave wives some independence from their husbands, the tax due
was still calculated on the basis of the couple’s total income.96 The liability
was then divided in proportion to each spouse’s respective income.97
Husbands could also make this election and might do so “to prevent a husband
with a small income being liable for the tax on his wife’s substantial

in paid employment. Id. See also Roger Kerridge, Taxation and Marriage, 47 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
77, 79 (1988).
92. See REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N, supra note 90, at 56–57; EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES
COMM’N, supra note 79, at 7–8. The value of the WEIA was raised to that of the SPA in order to
induce women to enter the job market. Id. at 7.
93. EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMM’N, supra note 79, at 7. If a husband did not use all of the
MMA, the remainder could be transferred and used to offset his wife’s income; any of the WEIA
not used against the wife’s earned income was forfeited. See id. at 8.
94. See REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N, supra note 90, at 56–57.
95. Finance Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 10, § 9 (U.K.); REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N,
supra note 90, at 56–57.
96. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N, supra note 90, at 56–57. While spouses could elect
individual filing, the system still imposed joint taxation, so the calculation of taxes due was based
on spouses’ combined returns. Id.
97. Id.
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investment income.”98 This option thus allowed spouses the independence of
individual filing, but it did not allow them independence in their dealings with
the government or reduce their marriage penalties. This option was not widely
known and was rarely used.99
British women, unsatisfied with these modest gains, pressured the
government to have the Royal Commissions convened in 1920 and 1954
consider individual taxation.100 Recognizing that individual taxation would
decrease the effective tax rates of wealthy couples because couples would shift
income between spouses to maximize use of lower rate brackets, the
Commissions did not find the urgings for individual taxation persuasive.101
For example, the 1920 Commission wrote:
We feel that the demand of those who favour this change is in effect not so
much a demand for separate assessment or separate recovery of tax—this they
can have under the existing law—as for a diminution in Income Tax liability
102
on the ground that part of the joint income happens to belong to the wife.

The government estimated that the loss in revenue would be substantial: £20
million in 1920 and £143 million in 1954.103 Moreover, according to both
Commissions, families functioned as units and should be taxed as such.104
Professor Lillian Knowles, the first female Professor of Economic History and
the only woman on the 1920 Commission, issued a powerful dissent.105
While the U.K. was resisting change, many other countries were reevaluating their tax units. The German Constitutional Court, in 1957, held that
joint taxation of married couples imposed a higher tax on some married
couples than if the spouses had not married, which violated constitutional

98. Mavis Moulin, Taxmen Are Male and Chauvinists All, GUARDIAN (Manchester), Mar. 2,
1974, at 19.
99. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N, supra note 90, at 57.
100. See id. at 57–58 (noting that there had been a “great deal of public attention” to the
matter and that the committee interviewed numerous witnesses from women’s societies); ROYAL
COMM’N ON THE TAXATION OF PROFITS & INCOME, supra note 62, at iii.
101. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N, supra note 90, at 57–58.
102. Id. at 58. See also ROYAL COMM’N ON THE TAXATION OF PROFITS & INCOME, supra
note 90, at 36–37.
103. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N, supra note 90, at 58; ROYAL COMM’N ON THE
TAXATION OF PROFITS & INCOME, supra note 62, at 37.
104. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N, supra note 90, at 57–58. See also ROYAL COMM’N ON
THE TAXATION OF PROFITS & INCOME, supra note 62, at 36, 40–41. There was a sense in 1954
that any potential harm caused by aggregation was offset by the husband and wife’s exemptions.
Id. at 36. If a husband who had income taxable at the basic tax rate was married to a woman with
investment income and their joint income was below the surtax rate level, their tax bill would
only be higher if the wife’s separate income was more than £90, a not insignificant amount in
1954. Id. If a wife’s income was earned, their combined tax bill would only be higher if their
joint income exceeded the princely sum of £2,100. Oldman & Temple, supra note 3, at 589.
105. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N, supra note 90, at 151.
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protections of marriage and the family.106 This led the German government to
adopt income-splitting joint filing which gave most married couples favorable
treatment compared to their single counterparts.107 On the other hand, while
Canada had a system of individual taxation since its income tax was first
introduced in 1917, both the Royal Commission on Taxation and the Royal
Commission on the Status of Women unsuccessfully recommended the family
as the tax unit.108 The Royal Commission on Taxation, in particular, was
troubled by the amount of tax avoidance perpetrated under Canada’s individual
system, even though the law purportedly denied recognition of transfers
between spouses for tax avoidance purposes.109
The U.S. also engaged in these debates. When the modern American tax
was first enacted in 1913, Congressman Cordell Hull of Tennessee
contemplated requiring spouses to file jointly to prevent wealthy couples from
using the family as a means of tax avoidance as they had during the Civil War,
but Hull ultimately concluded that married women’s property acts would make
such a law unconstitutional.110 As a result, Congress enacted a system that

106. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 17, 1957,
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 56, 1957 (Ger.); see also
THURONYI, supra note 21, at 93. Courts in Cyprus, Ireland, Italy, Korea, and Spain have also
held joint taxation unconstitutional. Id.
107. AULT ET AL., supra note 21, at 67.
108. See 3 ROYAL COMM’N ON TAXATION, REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON
TAXATION: TAXATION OF INCOME 12–15 (1966) (Can.); ROYAL COMM’N ON THE STATUS OF
WOMEN, REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 303–04 (1970)
(Can.). Half of the federal Interdepartmental Committee on the Taxation of Women in 1975–
1976 also wanted joint taxation. Dulude, supra note 20, at 84–85.
109. See Dulude, supra note 20, at 83–84. For a recent discussion of individual filing in
Canada, with a sense of concern, see David G. Duff, Neuman and Beyond: Income Splitting, Tax
Avoidance, and Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of Canada, 32 CAN. BUS. L.J. 345
(1999) (examining a relevant case); Herbert J. Schuertze, Income Splitting Among the SelfEmployed, 39 CAN. J. ECON. 1195 (2006) (estimating the amount of illegal income splitting in
Canada); Frances Woolley, Policy Forum: Liability Without Control—The Curious Case of
Pension Income Splitting, 55 CAN. TAX J. 603 (2007) (arguing for alternate measures to achieve
the effect of income splitting); Lisa Philipps, Income Splitting and Gender Equality: The Case for
Incentivizing Intra-Household Wealth Transfers (Comparative Research in Law & Political Econ.
Law, Research Paper Ser. No. 04/2010, 2010) (examining how income splitting has expanded tax
planning opportunities for spouses). There is a movement, at least among social conservatives, to
allow more income splitting between Canadian spouses to aid one-earner families. See
Kesselman, supra note 10, at 35; Jack Mintz, Taxing Families: Does the System Need an
Overhaul?, INST. OF MARRIAGE & FAM. REV., Spring/Summer 2008, at 15.
110. ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAX HANDBOOK SUPPLEMENT: 1941–42 § 1016
(1941). See also CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2515–16 (1863) (stating that under the
existing system wealthy individuals abused the tax system by dividing their income among their
family members). Congress devoted little time to the specifics of the tax in 1913. See Stephanie
Hunter McMahon, A Law with a Life of Its Own: The Development of Federal Income Tax
Statutes Through World War I, 7 PITT. TAX REV. 1 (2009).
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treated the individual as the basic unit for measuring the amount of federal
income taxes owed.111
Many American groups looked to the U.K. in search of guidance on
whether to change this tax unit, although Americans did not seem to be aware
that British women had the option of individual filing and their own exemption
for earned income.112 In response to wealthy couples’ tax avoidance, the
Treasury Department often lobbied, unsuccessfully, for a mandatory joint
system.113 Women’s groups, in particular the National Woman’s Party (NWP),
noted that British women protested mandatory joint taxation as discriminatory,
and NWP voiced similar opinions when the Treasury Department made its
proposals.114 Dismissing claims that joint taxation discriminated against
wives, Representative John Boehne of Indiana argued that the U.K. illustrated
that it “does not invade the rights of a married woman. It treats her exactly in
the same manner as her husband.”115 Representative Edith Rogers of
Massachusetts and Representative Frances Bolton of Ohio responded that
British law “ha[d] always been unfair to women.”116 As the U.K. noted in its
1954 Commission report, the U.S. responded to these debates by adopting the
income-splitting joint return in 1948.117
Thus, countries including the U.K. and the U.S. debated the appropriate tax
unit, but these debates often did not result in immediate legislative change.
They also did not result in all countries agreeing on the same answer to the
question of what constitutes the best tax unit. Instead, the adoption of
individual taxation, in the U.K. at least, would require progress within the
European women’s movement and changing domestic economic circumstances
to provide an environment in which individual taxation could be won. Until
those changes came, many felt the original system, one that saw the family as a
unit, was most fair.

111. Tariff of 1913, ch. 16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114, 116 (1913).
112. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 1040, at 64–68 (1941).
113. Stephanie Hunter McMahon, To Have and To Hold: What Does Love (of Money) Have
to Do with Joint Tax Filing?, 10 NEV. L.J. 101, 115–21 (forthcoming 2011).
114. E. Mary Goodman, British Women Urging Reform on Parliament, ATLANTA CONST.,
Jan. 26, 1919, at A9; An Englishman’s Wife’s Income, EQUAL RTS., June 9, 1928, at 138;
Britain’s Married Women Seek “Single” Tax Rating, EQUAL RTS., May, 1942, at 39; British
Income Taxation Unequal, EQUAL RTS., June 4, 1926, at 130; British Women Phrase Demands,
EQUAL RTS., May 25, 1929, at 124; Urges Separate Taxation for Married Persons, EQUAL RTS.,
May 3, 1924, at 90; Wives and Income Taxes, EQUAL RTS., Mar. 20, 1926, at 42.
115. 87 CONG. REC. 6480 (1941).
116. Id. at 6600, 6715.
117. See Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, §§ 301–303, 62 Stat. 110, 114–16 (1948);
ROYAL COMM’N ON THE TAXATION OF PROFITS & INCOME, supra note 62, at 37.
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The 1970s: The Beginning of the End

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the U.K. joined in a feminist revival that
swept across Europe at the same time that the nation enjoyed a period of
relatively rapid economic growth.118 As a result, British feminists added
demands for financial and legal independence to their earlier critiques of the
nation’s policies.119 There was a sense among these activists that the U.K.’s
prosperity would allow the nation to provide this to its wives. British demands
were reinforced by the European Community (EC) as it issued directives for
economic equality.120 By the 1970s, the EC included with this the adoption of
individual taxation. “[E]qual treatment shall mean that there shall be no
discrimination whatso[e]ver on grounds of sex either directly or indirectly by
reference in particular to marital or family status.”121
Many countries heeded the EC’s call; however, some countries had goals
other than gender equality. For example, individual taxation was introduced in
Sweden in 1971 and was coupled with the rapid expansion of subsidized
childcare because Sweden wanted to incentivize wives to work in order to
reduce immigration during a national labor shortage.122 As a result of these
changes, Sweden witnessed rising labor force participation by wives
throughout the 1970s, but it was largely in part-time jobs.123 Indeed, Sweden
even experienced a flow of women from full-time to part-time work.124
Similar forces were at play in the U.K., where advances in women’s rights
were made but a reluctance to push the advances too far remained. A
significant number of British women entered the paid labor market for the first
time, but much of that increased presence was in part-time, insecure, and

118. Alexander Cairncross, Economic Policy and Performance, 1964–1990, in 3 THE
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF BRITAIN SINCE 1700: 1939–1992, at 67, 67–70, 73–80 (Roderick Floud
& Donald McCloskey eds., 2d ed. 1994); Miriam E. David, Family Roles from the Dawn to Dusk
of the New Elizabethan Era, in REWRITING THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 17, 20 (Geoff Dench ed.,
Transaction Publishers 1999) (1997).
119. David, supra note 118, at 20.
120. EC Comm’n on Income Taxation, supra note 2, at 262; Council Directive 79/7/EEC, art.
1, 1978 O.J. (L 6) 24; Council Directive 76/207/EEC, art. 2, 1976 O.J. (L 39) 39; Council
Directive 75/117/EEC, art. 1, 1975 O.J. (L 45) 19, 20.
121. Council Directive 76/207/EEC, supra note 120, at 39.
122. Anders Björklund, Rising Female Labour Force Participation and the Distribution of
Family Income—The Swedish Experience, 35 ACTA SOCOLOGICA 299, 299 (1992); Siv
Gustafsson, Separate Taxation and Married Women’s Labor Supply: A Comparison of West
Germany and Sweden, 5 J. POPULATION ECON. 61, 63–64 (1992).
123. See Björklund, supra note 122, at 301, 304–05, 307 tbl.4; Rachel A. Rosenfeld & Gunn
Elisabeth Birkelund, Women’s Part-Time Work: A Cross-National Comparison, 11 EUR. SOC.
REV. 111, 114 (1995).
124. Rosenfeld & Birkelund, supra note 123, at 114.
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intermittent jobs.125 While there was a seemingly dramatic growth in public
approval for women in the workforce, this approval extended only, and extends
today only, to women who did not have pre-school and school age children in
the home.126 Thus, by the 1970s, the public and most government policies
were sensitive to gender issues, but this sensitivity was tempered by a
reluctance to grant economic independence to the country’s wives.127
Nevertheless, in 1971, British couples with two earners won the right for
married women to be taxed as single individuals on their earned income.128
Thus, two years before the U.K. entered the EC (but after the Conservative
Party had regained control of the government), Parliament responded to
domestic and European pressure and legislated that, if both spouses elected, a
wife could be taxed separately on her wages; her unearned income still had to
be reported by, and taxed to, her husband. There was a cost imposed on
individual taxation that might have outweighed the economic and
psychological benefits of separate status: the inability to claim the marital
exemption, the MMA.129 At the time, the MMA, at £600, was larger than the
SPA, at £420.130 For couples with two earners, the wife’s exemption, the
WEIA, of £420 was added on top of this larger MMA.131 If a couple opted to
be taxed separately as two single persons, for example if the wife earned
enough income to benefit from double-dipping into lower tax brackets, the
couple would lose the benefit of the difference between the MMA plus the
WEIA (£1,020) and two SPAs (£840), or £180, of exempted income. In 1975,
in couples where wives did work for wages, wives’ income on average made
up only 20.4% of the family’s total income.132 If couples filed separately, only

125. Jonathan Gershuny, Sexual Divisions and the Distribution of Work in the Household, in
REWRITING THE SEXUAL CONTRACT, supra note 118, at 141, 142.
126. Id. at 141–42. The British Social Attitudes surveys conclude that a woman should work
before they have children and after the children leave home, but only 1 in 20 think she should
work if she has a preschool child, and 1 in 5 if she has school-aged children. Stein Ringen ed.,
Family Change and Family Policies: Great Britain, in FAMILY CHANGE AND FAMILY POLICIES
IN GREAT BRITAIN, CANADA, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE UNITED STATES 29, 44 (Sheila B.
Kamerman & Alfred J. Kahn eds., Family Change and Family Policies in the West Ser., 1997).
Age is the most important predictor of these views, with those over sixty considerably more likely
to think women should stay home. Id.
127. Amy Black & Stephen Brooke, The Labour Party, Women, and the Problem of Gender,
1951–1966, 36 J. BRIT. STUD. 419, 449–50 (1997); David, supra note 118, at 21, 38.
128. Finance Act 1971, c. 68, § 23, sch 4 (U.K.).
129. Id. See also John Jeffrey-Cook, Separate Taxation of Wife’s Earnings, 6 BRIT. TAX
REV. 439, 439 (1980).
130. Finance Act 1971, c. 68, § 33(2) (U.K.).
131. Id.
132. EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMM’N, supra note 79, at 51.
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this portion of a couple’s income would enjoy double-dipping in the wife’s low
tax brackets, often not enough to warrant the loss of the MMA.133
Shortly after this change in law, the U.K. entered the EC and, within the
decade, the British economy plummeted.134 After several major strikes, the
government declared a state of emergency, and most of British industry was
put on a three-day week.135 Inflation ravaged the country, and unemployment
steadily rose until 1977 and, although unemployment lessened somewhat from
1977 to 1979, it continued to rise until 1986.136 By the late 1970s, top tax rates
were as high as 98% in order to pay off a loan from the International Monetary
Fund and, as an unintended, but not unexpected, consequence of the rate
increase, tax avoidance was rampant.137
In this economic downturn, the British Equal Opportunities Commission
(EOC) published a booklet entitled Income Tax and Sex Discrimination.138
This independent, non-departmental public body complained that the HMRC
did not advertise benefits, such as individual taxation, which would benefit
wives.139 Using excerpts from letters it had received, the EOC also illustrated
that the system deeming a wife’s income to be her husband’s was regarded, “at
best, as humiliating and, at worst discriminatory.”140 The anger was directed
less at the economics of husband taxation than at its mechanics—wives would
often receive letters from the HMRC about their jobs requesting their husbands
send in corrected forms.141 The EOC noted that women were frustrated that
the Inland Revenue “persists in treating them as if they do not exist.”142 One
woman later requested not individual taxation but, instead, that both spouses be
required to sign a joint tax return in order to “ensure not only that the wife’s
status as an equal partner was recognised, but that she took her share in the
joint financial chores.”143
While the EOC promoted individual taxation, it also recognized that
couples might use that system to reduce their taxes by shifting unearned

133. See Jeffrey-Cook, supra note 129, at 439.
134. Cairncross, supra note 118, at 68–71, 77–80.
135. Id. at 79–80.
136. Id. at 70.
137. Id. at 68–70, 83; Garnham, supra note 50.
138. EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMM’N, supra note 79. Private groups were also interested in
the issue of family taxation. See INST. FOR FISCAL STUD., THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF
DIRECT TAXATION 382–84 (2d impression 1978).
139. EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMM’N, supra note 79, at 3–4.
140. Id. at 4.
141. Id. at 7.
142. Id. For example, the general rule was to address correspondence to the husband, and to
send rebates and bills to him, since he was legally liable for tax on both spouses’ incomes. Id. at
19–20.
143. Mary Stott, Carry on Fussing, WOMAN’S GUARDIAN, May 17, 1973, at 9.
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income between spouses.144 Because this would be costly to the government,
the EOC concluded that the income tax should continue to aggregate a married
couple’s unearned income for the determination of the applicable tax rates, but
the amount of tax due should be apportioned and individual assessments
issued.145 The goal was to grant wives independence while preventing tax
avoidance, a problem everyone at the time understood well.
In response to a deluge of more than 2,000 letters reacting to the EOC’s
report, the British government commissioned a green paper entitled The
Taxation of Husband and Wife, released in 1980, the beginning of a decade in
which policymakers would focus on cutting tax rates.146 A green paper is a
tentative, open-ended government report, and this one supported either of two
courses of action: 1) allow spouses to choose between joint and individual
taxation; or 2) change to a Canadian-style mandatory individual system.147
The British government’s efforts at tax reform stalled after publishing this
paper.148
The U.S. did not adopt a similar method of partial individual taxation in
the 1970s; instead, American policymakers focused on the interests of single
taxpayers.149 The need for some limitation on the burden shouldered by single
144. EQUAL OPPORTNUNITIES COMM’N, supra note 79, at 29.
145. Id. at 29–30.
146. Dulude, supra note 20, at 77–78. See also CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, THE
TAXATION OF HUSBAND AND WIFE, 1980, Cmnd. 8093 (U.K.); J.A. KAY & M.A. KING, THE
BRITISH TAX SYSTEM 103 (5th ed. 1990). At least 730 of the letters demanded that the tax
system treat married women as separate individuals. Dulude, supra note 20, at 77–78. There
were four possibilities for how the tax system economically impacted married couples after 1972.
First, if one person had earned income and the other had no income, the couple would be better
off married; aggregation would be irrelevant but they would receive a MMA if the income was
earned by the husband and, if it was earned by the wife, they would also receive a WEIA.
Second, if both had income that collectively would be taxed in the lower tax bracket and the
woman’s income was earned, the couple would be better off married; aggregation would not push
the couple into higher rate brackets and they would be entitled to the larger MMA plus the WEIA.
Third, if their incomes would push them collectively into higher rate brackets and the woman’s
income was earned, the couple would be in exactly the same position as two single taxpayers
because the spouses would opt for separate taxation. Finally, if the woman had investment
income and either no earned income or less earned income than her exemption, the couple would
be subject to extra tax when married because they would lose the woman’s SPA to offset the
unearned income. This latter scenario was the only time a couple was worse off economically
with marriage. CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, supra, at 5–7.
147. CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, supra note 146, at 19, 24. Of 37 organizations that
responded to the 1980 green paper, 4 favored retaining joint returns, 13 supported transferrable
exemptions, and 29 used the opportunity to advocate giving additional financial assistance to
families with children. PAHL, supra note 84, at 163–64.
148. Dulude, supra note 20, at 79.
149. Dennis Joseph Ventry, Jr., The Treatment of Marriage Under the U.S. Federal Income
Tax, 1913 to 2000 421 (Sep. 2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of CaliforniaSanta Barbara).
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taxpayers had been recognized almost from the income-splitting joint return’s
creation in 1948.150 In response to public pressure, in 1951, certain qualified
single persons with dependents were given one-half of the tax advantage
enjoyed by married couples.151 As the qualifications for this benefit were
gradually loosened, broader discussions about the equity of denying single
individuals equality with married couples continued.152 Congress proposed 23
bills in 1967, 13 bills in 1968, and 61 bills in 1969 addressing this concern.153
Instead of abolishing income splitting, these legislators wanted to nullify its
impact by extending its tax savings to more taxpayers.154 Political compromise
produced the Tax Reform Act of 1969 that ensured all taxpayers filing as
single individuals would not pay more than 120% of that paid by joint filers.155
Although the U.S.’s 1969 tax revision added a new tax penalty on
marriage, by which two single persons both with taxable income could find
their income tax liabilities increased if they married, it was argued to be “a
necessary result of changing the income-splitting relationship between single
and joint returns.”156 In 1972, the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy
acknowledged that the Treasury Department had known there would be the
imposition of higher taxes on some married couples prior to the legislation’s
enactment and that Congress had been warned.157 This warning does not seem
to have stuck with politicians who claimed to be surprised when letters began
pouring in complaining of the “marriage penalty.”158 Nevertheless, the

150. See, e.g., H.R. 1325, 81st Cong. (1949) (reducing tax obligations of widows and
widowers). See also George F. James, The Income of Married Couples: Is the Knutson Bill
Justice?, 26 TAXES 311, 366 (1948) (discussing the proposed change in treatment of widows);
Frances M. Ryan, Federal Tax Treatment of the Family, 33 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 21–24 (1949)
(discussing changes to federal tax law implemented by the Revenue Act of 1948). It was reported
that Congress also began considering adjusting the rate schedule for married couples. House
Group Votes Down Tougher Tax Treatment for Married Couples, WALL ST. J., May 9, 1951, at 6.
They also considered deductions for war widows’ child care expenses. Would Aid War Widows,
N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1948, at 20.
151. Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-183, § 301, 65 Stat. 452, 480–83 (1951).
152. Ventry, supra note 149, at 298–330.
153. Id. at 342.
154. Id. at 426.
155. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 803, 83 Stat. 487, 678–85 (codified
as amended at IRC §§ 1–3 (2006)).
156. Id. § 803, 83 Stat. 487, 678; STAFF OF J. COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION,
91ST CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969 10, 222–24 (J. Comm.
Print 1970).
157. Tax Treatment of Single Persons and Married Persons Where Both Spouses are
Working: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 92d Cong. 73–75 (1972) (statement
of Edwin S. Cohen, Assistant Sec’y for Tax Policy, Dep’t of Treasury).
158. Ventry, supra note 149, at 419.
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immediate aftermath was largely a demand for still more help for singles.159 In
1970 and 1971, members of Congress introduced seventeen and fifty-nine
pieces of legislation, respectively, to equalize the income tax treatment of
married and single taxpayers.160
Therefore, although in the late 1960s and early 1970s the U.S. and the
U.K. both enacted legislation regarding the tax unit, the paths they chose were
different and reflected different goals. As the U.K. was giving wives the
ability to reduce their taxes by separately reporting their earned income and
being taxed as single taxpayers on that income, the U.S. was providing tax cuts
for single taxpayers and, as a result, began imposing a tax penalty on couples
with two earners. While both approaches were adopted by conservative
elements in their respective governments, their rhetoric reflected a different
valuation of wives’ employment.
C. The 1980s: The Time Is Now
As the equal treatment of women gained greater popular acceptance in the
U.K., the public bureaucracies overseeing the enforcement of the laws
mandating that equal treatment were steadily losing popular support. When
Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister in 1979, she did so on a wave of
criticism of statism.161 Thatcher, like her American counterpart President
Ronald Reagan, prioritized the reduction of the role of the state in the economy
and re-focused attention on individual rights.162 The new vision of the income
tax was intentionally less redistributive and sought to stimulate the economy
by reducing marginal tax rates and increasing exemptions.163 As in the U.S.
under Reagan, during Thatcher’s tenure, there was a gradual economic
recovery in the U.K. and a boom in the late 1980s.164

159. See, e.g., 118 CONG REC. S35,988 (1972) (statement of Sen. Robert William Packwood);
118 CONG. REC. 16,117 (1972) (statement of Rep. Bella S. Abzug); 116 CONG. REC. H36,634–
H36,635 (1970) (statement of Rep. Edward Koch); 117 CONG. REC. S3037–S3038 (1971)
(statement of Sen. Abraham A. Ribicoff); 116 CONG. REC. 8442 (1970) (statement of Rep.
William L. St. Onge).
160. Ventry, supra note 149, at 426.
161. David, supra note 118, at 21.
162. See id.; John Tiley, United Kingdom, in FAMILY TAXATION IN EUROPE 129, 131–32
(Maria Teresa Soler Roch ed., 1999).
163. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE OECD JOBS STUDY: TAXATION,
EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 45, 63–64 (1995). Tax rates rose steadily between 1973
and 1979 when rates halted. Price, supra note 41, at 592.
164. Lee Bawden & Frank Levy, The Economic Well-Being of Families and Individuals, in
THE REAGAN EXPERIMENT: AN EXAMINATION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICIES UNDER THE
REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 459, 482–83 (John L. Palmer & Isabel V. Sawhill eds., Changing
Domestic Priorities Ser., 2d prtg. 1982); Cairncross, supra note 118, at 67.
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In the early Thatcher era, wives’ tax treatment continued to gain significant
attention.165 Most responses to the 1980 green paper favored individual
taxation; they demonstrated widespread dissatisfaction with husband taxation
largely because it was thought to deny women independence and privacy in tax
matters and to impose a tax penalty on marriage.166 On the heels of the green
paper’s publication, a widely-read survey circulated decrying the extent of
sharing (or, more accurately, the lack of sharing) within marriage.167 Professor
Jan Pahl concluded that “there is a considerable amount of evidence to suggest
that such sharing of income cannot be taken for granted.”168 Pahl found in the
standard patterns of money management within marriage, wives came out the
loser in control, discretion, and freedom.169
Nonetheless, British proponents of individual taxation could not win
sufficient parliamentary support, in part because they could not agree how an
individual-based system should operate.170 In particular, they fought over how
to reconcile the old exemption system with individual taxation. While many
advocated transferable exemptions, so that if a wife had no income of her own
her exemption could be used to offset her husband’s income, others worried
that this would dampen wives’ incentive to work.171 Critics argued that if a
wife returned to work after a period of working at home, she would have to
choose between leaving her exemption with her husband and paying more tax
herself or taking back her exemption and increasing the tax imposed on her
husband.172 As many as 3.5% of wives engaged in paid employment at the
time, totaling 200,000 women, would leave the labor force if given an
exemption that they could transfer to their husband.173 It was on that basis the
House of Lords argued against transferrable exemptions.174
While mired in internal debates over the operation of individual taxation,
the U.K. continued to face pressure from the EC to change its tax unit. The
EC’s push for greater equality between the sexes and favorable taxation for
165. Lorraine Fox Harding, “Family Values” and Conservative Government Policy: 1979–
1997, in CHANGING FAMILY VALUES 119, 124 (Gill Jagger & Caroline Wright eds., 1999).
166. CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, supra note 146, at forward.
167. Jan Pahl, Patterns of Money Management within Marriage, 9 J. SOC. POL’Y. 313, 316
(1980).
168. Id. at 314. Pahl published a book on the topic in 1989. PAHL, supra note 84. Pahl has
updated her studies in Jan Pahl, His Money, Her Money: Recent Research on Financial
Organisation in Marriage, 16 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 361 (1995).
169. See Pahl, supra note 167, at 320, 330, 333.
170. Dulude, supra note 20, at 78–79.
171. Id. at 78.
172. PAHL, supra note 84, at 164.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 165. The issue of transferrable exemptions was revived in the Conservative
Party’s 1997 Election Manifesto. Ruth Lister, Promoting Women’s Economic Independence, in
REWRITING THE SEXUAL CONTRACT, supra note 118, at 180, 267 n.11.
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women focused on women’s right to engage in paid labor.175 Although British
wives had the ability to be taxed separately on earned income, in a survey
undertaken by the EC, 21% of those polled thought that income taxes might be
discouraging wives from working.176 This should have raised questions about
how salient the issue of the tax unit was with taxpayers, but the survey neither
distinguished between the incentive effects of tax rates and tax units nor
discussed these different potential causes of wives’ dissatisfaction with the tax
system.177
This renewed European concern might have focused more attention on
helping wives had many in the U.K. not experienced a deterioration in their
economic circumstances and a backlash of social conservatism. While the
1980s were a period of economic growth, they were also a period of
tremendous wealth polarization in both the U.K. and the U.S.178 The gender
pattern of employment also changed as businesses sought a more flexible labor
market.179 This benefited women and disadvantaged men, destabilizing
traditional labor arrangements.180 Because of changed labor patterns and
significant, static levels of unemployment, the period was marred by poverty
and social discontent.181 As in the U.S., which faced similar pressures from
175. Commission Proposal to Council for a New Community Action Programme on the
Promotion of Equal Opportunities for Women, at 18–19, COM (1981) 758 final (Dec. 9, 1981).
See also Commission Memorandum to Council on Income Taxation and Equal Treatment for Men
and Women, at 3, 12, COM (1984) 695 final (Dec. 14, 1984); Council Resolution on the
Promotion of Equal Opportunities for Women, 1982 O.J. (C 186) 3; Resolution on the Position of
Women in the European Community, 1981 O.J. (C 50) 35–36. The OECD was likewise active
with respect to this issue. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE INTEGRATION OF
WOMEN INTO THE ECONOMY 137–41, 153–59 (1985) (noting that traditional tax structures
disadvantage women in the labor market). Other groups concentrated on this issue as well: The
International Labour Organization, Council of Europe, European Trade Union Confederation,
European Youth Forum, Confederation of Family Organizations in the European Community, et
cetera. Commission Memorandum to Council on Equal Opportunities for Women, at 6, (COM
1985) 801 final (Dec. 19, 1985) [hereinafter Memorandum on Equal Opportunities for Women].
176. HÉLÈNE RIFFAULT & JEAN-FRANÇOIS TCHERNIA, COMM’N OF THE EUR. CMTY,
EUROPEAN WOMEN IN PAID EMPLOYMENT: 1984 19 (1984).
177. See id.
178. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 163, at 46.
179. Ros Coward, Was Feminism Wrong about the Family?, in REWRITING THE SEXUAL
CONTRACT, supra note 118, at 64, 65–66.
180. Id. at 65–67.
181. See Peter Ingram et al., Strike Incidence in British Manufacturing in the 1980s, 46
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 704, 704 (1993) (noting that one in forty bargaining groups went on
strike in the 1980s); Interview by Sheila Rowbotham with Jean McCrindle, More Than Just a
Memory: Some Political Implications of Women’s Involvement in the Miners’ Strike, 1984–85,
FEMINIST REV., Summer 1986, at 109, 117 (discussing how wives in mining villages who were
unhappy with community conditions and poverty became involved in the strike efforts in order to
improve conditions for their husbands and themselves); Clive Unsworth, The Riots of 1981:
Popular Violence and the Politics of Law and Order, 9 J.L. & SOC’Y 63, 81 (1982) (noting that
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de-industrialization, the troubled working class in the U.K. embraced family
values as a source of security in an uncertain time.182 This conservatism
extended beyond the working class, and many of society’s main concerns at
the time were stable, heterosexual marriages with a gender division of roles
and the support of these relationships by the government.183 This reversed
Britain’s earlier ideological push to increase working wives’ rights.184
In 1985, in the midst of this instability, the government commissioned a
second green paper on the topic of individual taxation.185 Unlike modern
American advocates of individual taxation, the British government’s focus was
not on easing the tax burdens of two-earner couples.186 Although the
government also claimed to want to give wives privacy and independence in
their tax matters, it primarily sought tax reduction for one-earner couples.187
The Commission focused on families’ life cycles and concluded that it was
natural for a family to sometimes have one earner and, at other times, two.188
The Commission thought husband taxation needed to be changed because it
disadvantaged couples when they were likely to have only one earner, such as
when they had young children.189 The one-earner couples to benefit from this
Commission’s proposals were wealthy ones.190 This formula for tax reduction
would not reduce the tax burden of low-income couples who had no income to
shift between spouses or of most two-earner couples because wives already
had a WEIA equal to the SPA to exempt most, if not all, their wages.191
Individual taxation, therefore, allowed the Conservative government to
reinforce the traditional, primary-earner family for wealthy couples by cutting

changing technology in the workplace will keep unemployment, and resulting discontent, high);
Victims of Thatcherism, 20 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 1717, 1717 (1985) (noting high unemployment
and resulting violence and unrest).
182. ALVIN Y. SO, SOCIAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT: MODERNIZATION, DEPENDENCY,
AND WORLD-SYSTEM THEORIES 238 (1990); Anne Barlow, Regulation of Cohabitation,
Changing Family Policies and Social Attitudes: A Discussion of Britain Within Europe, 26 LAW
& POL’Y 57, 60 (2004); Harding, supra note 165, at 119–20.
183. Harding, supra note 165, at 119.
184. Id.
185. CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, THE REFORM OF PERSONAL TAXATION, 1986,
Cmnd. 9756 (U.K.). The government also sought to allow all exemptions be transferred between
spouses in order “[t]o recognise the shared responsibilities of a married couple.” Id. at 12.
186. Id. at 4–5.
187. Id. at 3, 5.
188. Id. at 5.
189. Id. at 5. There were no limitations proposed to ensure that favorable treatment would
only help couples when they had young children or other care-giving responsibilities.
190. CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, supra note 185, at 3.
191. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. Transferable exemptions might have
reduced lower-income one-earner couples’ tax burdens, but it failed to win parliamentary support.
See supra text accompanying notes 170–71.
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taxes and did so without increasing the size of the government, pleasing both
the fiscally and socially conservative sides of the party.
While the 1986 green paper strongly supported individual taxation, as had
prior government reports, it recognized that under such a system, many couples
would have an incentive to rearrange their affairs to reduce their collective
income taxes.192 It concluded, however, that “[i]t is very unlikely that all
couples would seek to rearrange the ownership of their income-bearing assets
in order to take maximum advantage of separate tax rate bands. Many would
not be able, or would not want, to make the necessary transfer of assets.”193 It
was estimated that if every couple able to take advantage of income shifting
did so to the maximum extent, it would cost the government £100 million.194
Consideration of whether Parliament would need to take steps to prevent this
tax avoidance was deferred.195
The timing of the proposed change was crucial. The Commission knew it
had to wait until the computerization of the PAYE system in 1988 before it
could make such an extensive change.196 Individual taxation would increase
the number of taxpayers and require the coordination of family deductions.197
Waiting, however, threatened the proposal. There was no assurance that the
economic boom would continue or that there would not be a change in tax
philosophy. Luckily for advocates of individual taxation, 1988 was a peak
economic year.198 Although 1988 was the end of post-war economic growth,
the government retained the political capacity to change the tax unit and
thereby meet its goal of helping one-earner couples while complying with
European directives.199
The EC had once again demanded that “[t]ax discrimination should be
examined with a view to arriving at a neutral system which does not act as a
disincentive, particularly with regard to the taxation of the earnings of married
women.”200 The House of Lords understood that the EC also recommended a
tax system that was neutral as between married couples where one spouse or
both spouses were in paid employment.201 The commentary provided by the
House of Lords noted the seeming inconsistency in the EC’s objectives:

192. CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, supra note 185, at 26.
193. Id. (emphasis added). The government was also concerned that there would be “great
practical difficulties in enforcing such special provisions.” Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1.
197. See CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, supra note 185, at 12.
198. Charles Feinstein, Success and Failure: British Economic Growth Since 1948, in 3 THE
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF BRITAIN SINCE 1700: 1939–1992, supra note 118, at 95, 95.
199. Id.
200. Memorandum on Equal Opportunities for Women, supra note 175, at 12.
201. O’Donoghue & Sutherland, supra note 2, at 568.
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“Neutral” is here presumably intended to mean that one-earner and twoearner couples with the same total income should in principle pay the same tax.
However, such neutrality can be guaranteed only under an aggregate taxation
system. With independent taxation, the total tax depends on how the earnings
are split. There thus appears to be a contradiction between the first part of the
202
recommendation and the second.

Without reconciling those two objectives, Parliament adopted mandatory
individual taxation in 1988 to go into effect in 1990, so that all spouses were
taxed separately on earned and unearned income.203 Conservative Chancellor
Nigel Lawson pushed hard for this change to the tax unit.204 Perhaps counterintuitively to American scholars, Margaret Thatcher herself did not support
individual taxation, believing it would alienate working wives.205 Because of
the British system of exemptions, individual taxation would do little for most
two-earner couples and provide a lot of tax-planning opportunities for oneearner couples.206 Lawson was able to win this debate, over Thatcher’s
objections, by demonstrating that individual taxation would ease
unemployment by keeping wives out of the labor market.207 This motive flew
in the face of European directives even as it appeared to implement European
policy.
The U.K.’s Parliament also recognized that individual taxation would
cause some married couples to shift income between spouses to reduce their

202. Id. (quoting SELECT COMM. ON THE EUROPEAN COMTYS, COMMENTARY, 1985-6, H.L.
15I, ¶ 31 (U.K.)).
203. Finance Act 1988, c. 39, § 32 (Eng.). This change allowed for confidentiality between
spouses. Before the 1988 Act, a wife had to disclose to her husband her income in order for him
to accurately complete the couple’s return, but a husband did not have to disclose his information
to his wife. Susan Himmelweit, Making Visible the Hidden Economy: The Case for GenderImpact Analysis of Economic Policy, 8 FEMINIST ECON. 49, 61 (2002). Many lamented what this
did for women’s bargaining position within marriage. See id. Since 1990, husbands are only able
to find out about their wives’ tax affairs, and vice versa, if they are given written authority.
Independent Taxation Manual—IN3: Confidentiality, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, http://www.hm
rc.gov.uk/manuals/inmanual/IN3.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
204. NIGEL LAWSON, THE VIEW FROM NO. 11 814, 881 (2003). Lawson’s predecessor, Sir
Geoffrey Howe, also wanted individual taxation. Id. at 882. When Lawson pushed for larger
personal exemptions, he was troubled that couples with two earners would receive a higher
exemption than those with only one earner. Id. at 881. Lawson wanted transferable exemptions
to help one-earner couples, but he had to abandon transferrable exemptions because the HMRC
did not have the capacity to handle them until 1993, which would have been after another general
election. Id. at 883, 885. Some women thought the transferrable exemption would require
couples to share financial information, but Lawson thought “the wife for whom privacy was
important could always purchase it cheaply enough by letting her husband keep the transferable
allowance.” Id. at 884–85.
205. Id. at 882.
206. See id.
207. Id. at 884.
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collective tax obligations.208 There was debate on an amendment proposed by
the Labour Party that would deny this tax result for gifts between spouses that
were “undertaken with the sole or main objective of achieving a tax
advantage.”209 Norman Lamont, a Conservative member of Parliament,
complained that this prohibition:
would undermine the very basis of independent taxation. If the amendment
were carried, there would be no independence for married couples, nor would
people be free to arrange their affairs as they wished . . . Independent taxation
is bound to mean that some couples will transfer assets between them with the
result that their total tax bill will be reduced. This is an inevitable and
210
acceptable consequence of taxing husbands and wives separately.

Thus, there was recognition in 1988 that some couples would use individual
taxation for their own economic advancement, and that result was accepted by
the Conservative government.
While individual taxation proved relatively easy to adopt in 1988, it
remained difficult to adjust exemption levels. Exemptions are particularly
important in the U.K. because the British government exempts significant
amounts of income from tax.211 In 1990, almost 25% of the gross earnings of
the average single worker and 65% of those of the average married couple was
exempted from tax, which amounted to 2.9, 3.7, and 4.5 times the relief given
to single persons, married couples, and heads of households, respectively, in
the U.S.212 Due to the existing state of exemptions at the time Parliament was
contemplating reform in the 1980s (and the fact Parliament was considering
increasing exemptions), because two-earner families already enjoyed higher
exemptions (the MMA plus the WEIA), a simple across-the-board increase in
exemptions would have given two-earner couples 45% of the tax relief created
by the measure.213 This group constituted only 30% of taxpaying families.214
As a result, Parliament adjusted exemptions to produce a more proportionate
result. Specifically, it awarded each spouse a personal allowance (PA), equal
to the former SPA, and the couple received a married couple’s allowance
(MCA) equal to the additional amount previously received under the MMA.215
Couples were therefore no worse off after 1990 than they had been before.

208. Anne Redston, Income Sharing: The Nelsonian Option, 2007 BRIT. TAX REV. 680, 682
(2007).
209. Id. (quoting Chris Smith’s proposed amendment to the Finance Act 1989, Section 109
relating to gifts between spouses).
210. Id.
211. Pechman & Engelhardt, supra note 3, at 3.
212. Id. at 3–4.
213. CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, supra note 185, at 10.
214. Id.
215. Finance Act 1988, c. 39, §§ 257, 257A (Eng.). Initially, the MCA was set against a
husband’s income, but any unused portion could be transferred to the wife. Id. § 257D.
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The MCA was not indexed to inflation, however, so it gradually decreased in
real value over the 1990s.216 In response to continued complaints that married
couples were given favorable tax treatment compared to single taxpayers, the
MCA was greatly reduced in scope such that only couples where one person
had reached the age of sixty-five by April 2000 could take the allowance.217
As an aside, somewhat surprising given the current state of American
politics, consideration of same-sex couples does not appear to have played
much role in the British adoption of individual taxation. Individual taxation
could have been used to make an intermediate concession to same-sex couples,
putting them on the same footing as different-sex couples for tax purposes
without legally recognizing their unions. However, in the late 1980s, the
Conservative government could successfully ignore same-sex couples without
making any such concession.218 In fact, in 1988, Parliament referred to samesex relationships as “pretended family relationships.”219
As in the U.K., the 1980s was a conservative period in the U.S. Like
Thatcher, Reagan campaigned on a platform of tax reduction to stimulate
economic growth.220 One of Reagan’s first actions after taking office in 1981
was to slash tax rates.221 Unlike the British, however, Reagan took specific
steps to help two-earner couples, increasing the child and dependent care
credit. This credit originated in 1954 as a deduction, was converted to a nonrefundable credit in 1976, and increased in 1981 to be based on up to $2,000 of
the childcare expenses for one child and $4,000 of those for two or more

216. Id. § 257A. See also Antony Seely, Married Couple’s Allowance, H.C. Library Standard
Note SN/BT/870 3 (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.parliament.uk/briefingpapers/commons/lib/
research/briefings/snbt-00870.pdf.
217. Finance Act 1999, c. 16, § 31 (U.K.); see also Seely, supra note 216, at 3.
218. Brian Tobin, Same-Sex Couples and the Law: Recent Developments in the British Isles,
23 INT’L J. LAW, POL’Y & FAM. 309, 309 (2009).
219. Kenneth McK Norrie, We Are Family (Sometimes): Legal Recognition of Same-Sex
Relationships After Fitzpatrick, 4 EDINBURGH L. REV. 256, 268 (2000). Until the mid-1990s, the
U.K. took almost no action to recognize the rights of homosexuals but then, in 2004, Parliament
passed the Civil Partnership Act that is to replicate the rights and obligations of marriage for
same-sex couples. Carl F. Stychin, Couplings: Civil Partnership in the United Kingdom, 8 N.Y.
CITY L. REV. 543 (2005); Andrew Flagg, Note, Civil Partnership in the United Kingdom and a
Moderate Proposal for Change in the United States, 22 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 613, 614,
619–20 (2005). Same-sex couples still do not receive completely equivalent tax treatment; they
are not entitled to the inheritance tax exemption married couples receive and are also
disadvantaged with respect to the child credit. See WOMEN & EQUALITY UNIT, CIVIL
PARTNERSHIP: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX COUPLES 30
(2003), available at http://www.equalities.gov.uk/pdf/Civil%20Partnership%20-%20a%20frame
work%20for%20the%20legal%20recognition%20of%20same-sex%20couples.pdf.
220. Charles R. Hulton & June A. O’Neill, Tax Policy, in THE REAGAN EXPERIMENT: AN
EXAMINATION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICIES UNDER THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION,
supra note 164, at 97, 98.
221. Id.
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children.222 Reagan’s administration also added a dual earner deduction that
was intended to, and did, increase the number of wives in the workforce.223
Enacted in 1981, but repealed as part of the tax rate cuts enacted in 1986, the
dual-earner deduction saved two-earner couples up to $3,000 in taxes on the
income of the lower-paid spouse.224 While the U.S. took these small steps to
help two-earner families in the early 1980s, it partially pulled back from these
steps as its conservative economics became increasingly intertwined with
socially conservative attitudes similar to those developing in the U.K.225
Therefore, although both countries experienced a decade of tax cuts and
were generally conservative, only Parliament had enacted individual taxation
by the end of the 1980s. As the U.S. began to help two-earner couples, as the
British had in the 1970s, the British government adopted a policy that was
intended to benefit one-earner families. Indeed, despite the fact that individual
taxation had been a British feminist objective for more than a century,
Parliament enacted individual taxation for reasons that were anything but
feminist, seeking to help families economically while keeping women in the
home. Highlighting this objective, the U.K. continued to aggregate couples’
incomes to assess their eligibility for means-tested benefits and tax credits.226
222. I.R.C. § 214 (1954). The 1954 deduction was only available if it allowed the person
taking it to earn income. Id. amended by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §
504(a)(1), 90 Stat. 1520, 1563–64 (codified at I.R.C. § 44A), superseded by Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 103, 95 Stat. 172, 187 (codified at I.R.C. § 44A). I.R.C. §
129 was also enacted in 1981, providing a dependent care exclusion for assistance provided by
employers. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, § 129(d)(1), 95 Stat. at 199 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 129(d)(1)). For a discussion of the tax treatment of childcare, see generally Allan J. Samansky,
Child Care Expenses and the Income Tax, 50 FLA. L. REV. 245 (1998).
223. I.R.C. § 221 (1981) (incorporating Economic Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34,
§ 103, 95 Stat. 172, 187); Daniel R. Feenberg & Harvey S. Rosen, Alternative Tax Treatments of
the Family: Simulation Methodology and Results, in BEHAVIORAL SIMULATION METHODS IN
TAX POLICY ANALYSIS 7, 26–27 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1983); Gauff, supra note 3, at 435–36.
The majority of the increase of women in the labor force was the result of increased participation,
not increased hours, so it is likely that many women entered the market as part-time workers.
Jerry A. Hausman & James M. Poterba, Household Behavior and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, J.
ECON. PERSP., Summer 1987, at 101, 108.
224. I.R.C. § 221(b)(2) (1981) (incorporating Economic and Tax Recovery Act of 1981, Pub.
L. No. 97-34, § 103, 95 Stat. 172, 187) (repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, §
131, 100 Stat. 2085). For further discussion of Congress’s original intent, see S. REP. NO. 97-144
(1981).
225. See, e.g., John L. Palmer & Isabel V. Sawhill, Perspectives on the Reagan Experiment,
in THE REAGAN EXPERIMENT: AN EXAMINATION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICIES UNDER
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, supra note 164, at 1, 5 (“Embedded with this economic program
was a fundamentally conservative social philosophy for the responsibilities of the federal
government in promoting the general welfare and redressing inequalities among citizens and
fiscal disparities among communities.”).
226. Himmelweit, supra note 203, at 61. The U.K. also aggregates cohabitating couples’
incomes for purposes of determining eligibility for means-tested benefits and tax credits. AULT
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British women, nonetheless, welcomed individual taxation as a victory.
Individual taxation was deemed to end an offensive “explicit sex
discrimination.”227
III. DAYS OF RECKONING
The years following the enactment of individual taxation were not kind to
the British economy. The British pound was bound up in the EC’s European
Exchange Rate Mechanism until its restrictions led to a run on the pound.228
On Black Wednesday, 1992, Britain liberated its currency, but by then the
Conservative Party’s credibility for managing the economy was destroyed.229
Much as the nation had second thoughts about European exchange rates, it also
reassessed the value of individual taxation, in part because “virtually all the
financial benefit went to the relatively wealthy.”230 Nonetheless, the repeal of
individual taxation has not been seriously entertained.231 The new tax unit
appears to be here to stay.
This Part focuses on two ways people in the U.K. have altered their
behavior in response to the adoption of individual taxation. First, it looks at
the incentive effects individual taxation has had on British wives. In theory, it
should have induced more wives to enter the paid labor market or,
alternatively, encouraged husbands to shift the ownership of income-producing
property to their wives. Both would result in more of couples’ income being
taxed in the lower tax brackets of the country’s wives and would improve the
relative economic power of wives. Second, this Part looks at how individual
taxation encourages tax avoidance by higher-income spouses who do not want
to reduce their control over the income they shift for tax purposes. Some
higher-income spouses have sought to create new means of transferring tax
ownership, but little else, to their lower-income spouses. In turn, this tax
avoidance generates new pressures within the British tax system.

ET AL.,

supra note 21, at 321; Barlow, supra note 182, at 68. See also Susan B. Boyd & Claire
F.L. Young, Feminism, Law, and Public Policy: Family Feuds and Taxing Times, 42 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 545 (2004) (arguing feminists have little influence over British tax policy).
227. KAY & KING, supra note 146, at 43.
228. Larry Neal, Impact of Europe, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF MODERN
BRITAIN: STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND GROWTH, 1939–2000 267, 291–99 (Roderick Floud & Paul
Johnson eds., 2004).
229. Matthew Tempest, Treasury Papers Reveal Cost of Black Wednesday, GUARDIAN.CO.UK
(Feb. 9, 2005, 4:15 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/feb/09/freedomofinforma
tion.uk1.
230. CEDRIC SANDFORD, WHY TAX SYSTEMS DIFFER: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TAXATION 59 (2000).
231. MUMFORD, supra note 12, at 127.
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Power to the Women

Individual taxation recognizes wives as autonomous individuals and
provides means for reducing couples’ collective taxes. As a result of the
interaction of these two effects, many scholars expect individual taxation to
produce significant changes in married couples’ behavior.232 Proponents of
individual taxation argue that these changes will be socially desirable.233 This
section focuses on two of these changes: the increased paid employment of
wives and their increased ownership of family property. While there is an
expectation that individual filing will influence behavior, we should also be
aware that, according to one survey, the majority of British citizens are
generally ignorant of the legal rights established by marriage.234 If British
couples are also ignorant of their actions’ tax consequences, this lack of
awareness would reduce the incentive effects of individual taxation.
1.

Employment of Wives

As the 1986 green paper illustrated, Parliament assumed that wives would
leave paid employment when they had children and that “the tax system should
not discriminate against families where the wife wishes to remain at home to
care for young children.”235 The government wanted to ensure that “[o]neearner couples at all income levels would see their tax burden fall
substantially.”236 This section questions whether individual taxation had its
intended result or whether it increased wives’ paid employment in the U.K.—
an unintended consequence for Parliament and some within the Thatcher
administration.
There is an on-going academic debate whether individual taxation
increases wives’ incentive to engage in paid employment. Studies seek to

232. Research on changes in taxpayer behavior following changes in marital deductions and
taxation of inter vivos gifts found that taxes do distort behavior. Alexander M.G. Gelardi, The
Influence of Tax Law Changes on the Timing of Marriages: A Two-Country Analysis, 49 NAT’L
TAX J. 17, 25 (1996); Katarina Nordblom & Henry Ohlsson, Tax Avoidance and Intra-Family
Transfers, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 1669, 1669 (2006). In the late 1970s, Britain transferred the child
allowance from husbands to wives, and some studies, but not all, found changes in behavior.
Julie L. Hotchkiss, Do Husband and Wives Pool Their Resources? Further Evidence, 40 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 519, 530 (2005); Shelly J. Lundberg et al., Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their
Resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom Child Benefit, 32 J. HUM. RESOURCES 463, 479
(1997).
233. Lundberg et al., supra note 232, at 479.
234. Barlow, supra note 182, at 72–73. Psychological benefits might also have been reduced
because the MCA was payable first to the husband, decreasing his tax burden relative to his
wife’s. See Finance Act 1988, c. 39, §§ 257, 257A (Eng.); FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH
OFFICE, BRITAIN 1991: AN OFFICIAL HANDBOOK 402 (1991).
235. CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, supra note 185, at 14–15.
236. Id. at 17.
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determine whether the income tax, either the tax unit or tax rates, significantly
affects women’s employment decisions.237 One study conducted in Sweden
found that individual taxation encourages wives to provide more paid labor.238
A second study, on the other hand, shows that women in countries with joint
income taxation exhibit no statistically significant difference in their labor
force participation than women in countries with individual taxation.239 Yet
another study concludes that, with individual taxation, “it is not safe to assume
that labor supplies for different groups will change in the same direction.”240 If
nothing else, the available evidence indicates that the issue of wives’
workforce participation is complex, and it is unlikely that significant societal
disincentives will be eliminated by changing the tax unit.
To date there is little research on the impact the adoption of individual
taxation has had on British wives’ labor performance. Because British wives
previously had a separate exemption equal to that of a single person and the
ability to be taxed separately on their earned income, economic disincentives
were rare. They occurred where husbands or wives were unwilling to use
individual taxation for earned income or where the impact of losing the MMA
was greater than the reduction from having income taxed in lower tax brackets.
On the other hand, because wives’ exemptions are not transferrable, couples
lose them if wives have no income; this should create some increased incentive
for wives’ paid employment. Similarly, non-economic disincentives were
removed by the adoption of individual taxation. Although fewer than 35% of
British taxpayers file a return, for those who are married, individual taxation
means that wives no longer need to report their income to their husbands,
unless the sharing of information is necessary to determine the deductions and
credits that are still calculated on combined incomes.241 But while individual
taxation did create these additional incentives for wives to enter the work
force, their effect was likely modest because the previous system in the U.K.
was already relatively conducive to wives’ employment.
The evidence that exists of British wives entering the paid labor force as a
result of the change in the tax unit is inconclusive. Married women in the U.K.

237. Irene Dingeldey, European Tax Systems and their Impact on Family Employment
Patterns, 30 J. SOC. POL’Y 653 (2001); Feenberg & Rosen, supra note 223; Gustafsson, supra
note 122; A. Phipps & Peter S. Burton, Social/Institutional Variables and Behavior Within
Households: An Empirical Test Using the Luxemburg Study, 1 FEMINIST ECON. 151 (1995);
Rosenfeld & Birkelund, supra note 123; Nina Smith et al., The Effects of Taxation on Married
Women’s Labour Supply Across Four Countries, 55 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 417 (2003); Tanja
van der Lippe & Liset van Dijk, Comparative Research on Women’s Employment, 28 ANN. REV.
SOC. 221, 233 (2002).
238. Gustafsson, supra note 122, at 82.
239. Phipps & Burton, supra note 237, at 167.
240. Feenberg & Rosen, supra note 237, at 28.
241. See supra notes 44, 197, 203–04 and accompanying text.
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have relatively small labor supply elasticities that have not been substantially
changed by individual taxation.242 Consistent with trends throughout Europe,
as of spring 2004, 70% of British working-age women were employed,
compared to 58% in 1984, and, as a result, the difference between the
employment rate of men and women shrank from 19% in 1984 to 10% in
2005.243 However, barely more than 60% of all British couples with children
had two earners, and that number was only increased to 67% if there were no
children.244 More troubling, studies find that these numbers hide underlying
flaws in the labor market that might have been exacerbated by individual
taxation.245 Of those couples with two earners, only 33.8% had both spouses
working full-time and only 20.5% of couples with children under 15 had both
spouses working full-time.246 Only 8% of women working part-time said they
did so because they could not find full-time work; 74% said they did not want
to work full-time.247
Despite these feelings, part-time work is deleterious to women’s long-term
economic position as it does not provide many of the economic rewards of fulltime employment, namely private pensions. In fact, studies show women who
engage in predominantly part-time work for thirty years or more are not in any
better financial position than those who are economically inactive.248 And
while the payoff of increased employment experience has risen for wives who
work full-time, the pay penalty of part-time work has worsened.249 Therefore,
it is important to note that the combination of individual taxation and the
flattening of the tax brackets encouraged wives to enter into less well-paid,
less-secure, part-time employment when, and if, they needed additional
income. These changes do not seem to have created the opportunities or
motivation to seek out better paid, more secure, full-time alternatives.
While in the last two decades British wives have primarily entered parttime employment, there has nevertheless been a reaction against perceived
governmental incentives for wives to enter the labor force. Some blame the
tax system for creating, or at least acknowledging, changing family structures:

242. Stephens & Ward-Batts, supra note 12, at 1995.
243. OFFICE FOR NAT’L STATISTICS, supra note 29, at 143–44.
244. Dingeldey, supra note 237, at 663 (using data from 1996).
245. Because of individual taxation, wives have a lower effective rate of tax and, therefore,
reap larger after-tax rewards for each dollar earned and might be satisfied earning fewer dollars.
246. Dingeldey, supra note 237, at 663 (using data from 1996).
247. OFFICE FOR NAT’L STATISTICS, supra note 29, at 145.
248. Tom Sefton et al., Family Ties: Women’s Work and Family Histories and Their
Association with Incomes in Later Life in the UK 15 (Ctr. for the Analysis of Soc. Exclusion,
CASEpaper Ser., Discussion Paper No. CASE/135, 2008).
249. Hugh Davies et al., Forgone Income and Motherhood: What do Recent British Data Tell
Us?, 54 POPULATION STUD. 293, 294 (2000).
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Many see the new state libertarianism which has replaced [institutional support
for the traditional family] not as a withdrawal of interference in private lives so
much as the exercise of a new set of rules privileging a powerful interest
group. This perceived new elite, which has definite “meritocratic” features,
consists of professional “two-career” couples, who are better off when taxed as
independent workers, plus a growing entourage of fellow-travelling adult
“singles” whose relative affluence is similarly promoted by fiscal policies
250
treating “family life” as an individual lifestyle choice.

This backlash blames state policy for the fact that the nature of the family unit
has changed. Twenty-nine percent of all children born in 1991, the year after
individual taxation became effective, were born outside of marriage and, in
1991, 26% of households comprised just one person, compared with 17% in
1971.251 We will have to wait to see whether individual taxation is blamed for
changing family structures or celebrated for recognizing pre-existing social
changes.
Whether a change to individual taxation would produce similar results in
the U.S. is uncertain. In the post-World War II era, the U.S. also witnessed a
growth in the percentage of wives entering paid employment.252 With
individual taxation, one would expect a greater degree of responsiveness in the
U.S. because American wives have no earned income exemption equivalent to
the WEIA or the British right to be taxed separately on earned income.253 The
greater economic incentive might be counter-balanced by the fact that women
regard the U.S. joint return as less demeaning because both spouses, and not
simply the husband, are required to file the couple’s tax return. Changing the
British tax unit removed blatant discrimination in the administration of its
income tax and might have produced a sense of equality and individual
empowerment among wives unlikely to be experienced in the U.S. Therefore,
the adoption of individual taxation in the U.K. might have had a larger
psychological impact but less of an economic impact than a comparable
change would have in the U.S.

250. Geoff Dench, Nearing Full Circle in the Sexual Revolution, in REWRITING THE SEXUAL
CONTRACT, supra note 118, at 40, 41.
251. Ringen, supra note 126, at 39–40. Nonetheless, 41% lived in households that were
composed of married couples with dependent children and only about 10% lived alone. Id. at 40.
See also Harry Wallop, Death of the Traditional Family, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 15, 2009, 9:24 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.up/family/5160567/Death-of-the-traditional-family.html.
252. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NO. HS-30, MARITAL STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE CIVILIAN
LABOR FORCE (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/statab/hist/HS-30.pdf.
253. There is a capped childcare credit subject to a phase-out in the U.S. I.R.C. § 21 (2006).
See also Ann F. Thomas, Marriage and the Income Tax Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: A
Primer and Legislative Scorecard, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 103–04 (1999) (explaining the
child care credit).
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At this time, only inconclusive evidence suggests American wives avoid
entering the paid labor force because joint taxation imposes a higher tax
burden on them as the secondary earner within married couples.254 For
example, if we view the primary earner as earning a couple’s first dollar,
thereby producing the income taxed in the couple’s lowest tax brackets, then
the secondary earner’s first dollar of income would be taxed in the primary
earner’s top tax bracket.255 But not all scholars agree that wives should be
categorized as secondary wage earners. Lawrence Zelenak, for example,
argues that most couples do not have the economic luxury to categorize wives
as secondary wage earners.256 Similarly, Dorothy Brown argues that this
perspective of spouses’ roles is held mainly by upper-income white families.257
Studies show that even among wives who are discouraged from working,
the likelihood that joint taxation changes wives’ behavior is less true today as
more wives enter the labor force.258 As of 2007, 57.6% of all married couples
in the U.S. had two earners, and this is increasingly true for wealthier
couples.259 Other conditions, and other tax implications, counteract the
disincentives created by joint taxation. A Congressional Budget Office report
found that joint taxation leads the lower-earning spouse to work between 4%
and 7% less than he or she otherwise would.260 Therefore, the increase in
wives’ employment in the U.S. is not likely to be much greater than in the U.K.

254. See Cicconi, supra note 2, 260–64 (outlining recent studies of women’s participation in
the labor force). See also Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, Changes in the Labor Supply
Behavior of Married Women: 1980–2000, 25 J. LAB. ECON. 393 (2007) (noting that reduced labor
supply elasticities show government policies have a lesser distortionary effect on the quantity of
labor supplied); Nada Eissa & Hilary Williamson Hoynes, Taxes and the Labor Market
Participation of Married Couples: The Earned Income Tax Credit, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1931 (2004)
(finding the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit means 2% fewer wives are likely to enter
the labor force); Bradley T. Heim, The Incredible Shrinking Elasticities: Married Female Labor
Supply, 1978–2002, 42 J. HUM. RESOURCES 881 (2007) (concluding that wage and income
elasticities for women have greatly declined); Chinhui Juhn & Kevin M. Murphy, Wage
Inequality and Family Labor Supply, 15 J. LAB. ECON. 72 (1997) (finding wives of high-wage
men increasing their employment more than wives of low-wage men); Thomas A. Mroz, The
Sensitivity of an Empirical Model of Married Women’s Hours of Work to Economic and
Statistical Assumptions, 55 ECONOMETRICA 765 (1987) (concluding that tax rates have a small
impact on the decisions of working married women); Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84
GEO. L.J. 1571 (1996) (arguing that women’s labor decisions are less sensitive to tax changes in
the face of increased labor participation).
255. Blumberg, supra note 2, at 53.
256. Zelenak, supra note 2, at 348–54.
257. Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature: The Joint
Return, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1469, 1508–11 (1997).
258. See supra note 254.
259. U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, REPORT NO. 1018, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK
76 (2009).
260. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 1, at 12.
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Unfortunately, conclusions about the impact a change in tax unit will have
on wives’ employment remain unsatisfying. There is some evidence, but not
much, that British wives have responded to individual taxation by engaging in
paid employment; however, their new employment appears to be in part-time
work that continues to offer few of the benefits that full-time employment
provides.261 In the U.S., because fewer provisions exist to offset the
disincentives of a secondary earner, there is likely to be a greater response to
individual taxation unless the psychological impact of recognizing wives
separately from their husbands was particularly large in the U.K. Without
knowing the magnitude of this psychological impact, it is difficult to
extrapolate exactly how individual taxation would affect wives’ labor efforts in
the U.S., other than to conclude it is unlikely to reduce them. Based on the
British experience, policymakers should not expect a massive new entry of
wives into full-time employment upon the adoption of individual taxation.
More study needs to be performed to see who has entered the paid labor
market and, to the extent possible, what motivated their entry.
2.

Family Property Holdings

Before 1985, it was estimated that over half of all British wives owned
some investment property, held independently or jointly with their husbands.262
With the adoption of individual taxation, that percentage of wives and the
value of what they owned was expected to increase.263 Even Parliament
expected families would react to individual taxation by shifting income
between spouses in order to reduce couples’ collective taxes.264 In practice,
this means that wealthier husbands should transfer investment property to their
wives so that their wives could offset the income it generates with their
exemption and pay tax on the remaining income in their lower tax brackets.
This shifting of family property was expected to occur despite drawbacks
for the wealthier spouse. To be an effective transfer for British tax purposes,
the transfer to the lower-income spouse must immediately divest the
transferor’s beneficial interest and vest that interest either in the transferee or
in a valid trust for the transferee’s benefit.265 As in the U.S., whether a person
has sufficiently “given” property to another is a matter of intention and a
question of fact.266 Unlike in the U.S., however, couples in the U.K. hold
fewer easily transferred income-producing assets; more of a British family’s

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

See Davies et al., supra note 249, at 294; Sefton et al., supra note 248, at 15.
CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, supra note 185, at 25.
See Stephens & Ward-Batts, supra note 12, at 1990.
See id. Not until 1991 could the personal exemption offset interest income. Id. at 1993.
23(2) HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND 365 (4th ed., reissue 2002).
Id. at 366. See also Brennan Minors’ Trustees v. Scanlan, 9 T.C. 427, 434 (1925) (Eng.).
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wealth is held in its home, as opposed to, for example, stocks or bonds.267
British courts are also reluctant to recognize gifts between spouses for fear that
the intent is to put property beyond the reach of creditors.268 Therefore,
transfers of income-producing assets should have a relatively greater impact on
a higher-income British spouse, as compared to an American counterpart, as
the British have fewer assets to transfer and must do so convincingly.
The potential tax savings from this income shifting is widely known in the
U.K. and can be obtained with no tax cost, although administrative costs will
almost certainly be incurred. In its manual on capital gains, the HMRC
explains that a husband and wife or civil partners who are living together can
transfer assets between themselves without triggering a capital gain or capital
loss by completing, signing, and submitting a form indicating that there is a
new owner of the property.269 With some planning and the right kinds of
assets, couples can minimize their collective tax obligations. This benefit is
explained to couples in the popular press as “[t]he last remaining area where
there is tax-favourable treatment for those who are married.”270
One study has examined the shifting of family assets between spouses with
different marginal tax rates since the adoption of individual taxation.271 This
study found a sizeable shift in the incidence of taxable income; however, it
also found that few couples shifted income to the optimal level.272 In other
words, most couples left some tax dollars on the table. Only 18% of couples
shifted the optimal amount to the lower-income spouse if the husband’s tax
rate was higher than the wife’s, and only 30% did so if the wife’s tax rate was
higher.273 But while the study found that couples would not shift income to the
maximum extent possible to secure a tax reduction, it did find an increase in
three outcomes: the proportion of wives having any investment income; the

267. James Banks et al., Understanding Differences in Household Financial Wealth Between
the United States and Great Britain, 38 J. HUM. RES. 241, 246, 244 (2003).
268. GILLIAN DOUGLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO FAMILY LAW 99–100 (Clarendon Law Ser.,
2d ed. 2004) (2001).
269. CG22200—Transfer of Assets between Husband and Wife or between Civil Partners
Living Together, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/cgmanual/CG
22200.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2011). Individuals must not fall within any of the exceptions for
nonresident spouses. CG22300—Transfer of Assets between Husband and Wife or between Civil
Partners: Avoidance: Nonresident Spouse or Nonresident Civil Partner, HM REVENUE &
CUSTOMS, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/cgmanual/CG22300.htm (last visited Apr. 25,
2011). Spouses cannot transfer losses but they can transfer depreciated property before triggering
the loss, and then trigger the loss. Finance Act 1988, c. 39, § 104 (Eng.); Taxation of Chargeable
Gains Act, 1992, c. 12, §§ 3, 58 (Eng.).
270. Chas Roy-Chowdhury, Would Getting Married Save You Tax?, BBC NEWS (Apr. 6,
2006, 10:46 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3472573.stm.
271. Stephens & Ward-Batts, supra note 12, at 1989.
272. Id. at 2005.
273. Id.
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fraction of household investment income owned by wives; and the fraction of
households in which the wife held all of the investment income.274 The
authors concluded that a 10% differential in spouses’ marginal tax rates led to
a 2.6% to 3.1% increase in the share of investment income allocated to the
spouse with the lower marginal tax rate.275 This occurred despite the
transaction costs of such re-allocations.276 Based on this study, individual
taxation does increase the wealth, if not the earning power, of British wives.
While transfers of income appear to benefit women, there are instances
when women are, in fact, harmed. British husbands can transfer to their wives
interests with sufficient restrictions attached to secure income tax savings but
without transferring control.277 Similarly, it is possible to give an interest in
property that creates a joint ownership but not an equal ownership.278
Nevertheless, the HMRC has created a default rule allowing spouses each to
report 50% of the income of an asset held jointly regardless of actual
ownership interests.279 Tax advisors understand the rule’s value for wealthy
spouses: “This 50:50 rule is very useful if you wish to reduce you and your
spouse’s overall tax liability, but also retain much of the control over the
underlying assets. You could put the assets in joint name, but only give away a
5% share of the investments.”280 This can create situations where wives are
taxed on income they do not own and over which they have no control, even as
it produces lower collective tax burdens. Although the author has found no
cases to date, one can imagine that a spouse with such a 5% ownership interest
but a 50% tax bill might object if the marriage ends in divorce. At that point,
individual taxation might not seem so wife-friendly.
Similarly, family law might minimize the long-term impact of these taxdriven inter-spousal gifts. On one hand, in the event of a spouse’s death,

274. Id. at 1990.
275. Id.
276. Stephens & Ward-Batts, supra note 12, at 1992.
277. 23(2) HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 265, at 341–42. Such interests have
been developed and upheld in Canada. See Maureen Donnelly et al., Income Splitting and the
New Kiddie Tax: Major Changes for Minor Children, 48 CAN. TAX J. 979, 985 (2000); Duff,
supra note 109, at 346–47; Lisa Philipps, Cracking the Conjugal Myths: What Does it Mean for
the Attribution Rules?, 50 CAN. TAX J. 1031, 1034 (2002).
278. 23(2) HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 265, at 341–42.
279. Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, c. 1, § 283 (Eng.). See also IN6—Separating
the Couple’s Affairs, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/inmanual/
IN6.htm. Couples will only be taxed based on their actual interests if they file Form 17 indicating
that desire. Income and Corporation Taxes Act, c. 1, § 283. This does not apply to family
companies, in which case ownership is by interest. IN129—Income from Jointly Held Shares in a
Close Company, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/inmanual/IN129.htm.
280. Keith Gordon, How to Save Tax as a Married Couple, SCOTSMAN.COM (Aug. 24, 2004),
http://www.money.scotsman.com/scotsman/articles/articledisplay.jsp?section=Tax&article_id=99
1516.
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surviving spouses in the U.K. do not automatically receive all of their spouses’
property if there are other surviving relatives and, therefore, lower-income
spouses might receive more total assets if they received part as inter vivos gifts
from their higher-income mates.281 On the other hand, because the amount a
wife is entitled to on the death of an intestate spouse is tied to her maintenance,
this favorable result might not always occur.282 The earlier gift might simply
reduce the amount a wife is entitled to on the death of her husband.
In the event of divorce, the effect of these gifts might also be minimized as
a result of the liberalization of divorce law. Alimony and the division of
family property are resolved in the U.K. in an application for ancillary relief
after the divorce proceeding.283 Likened to the War of the Roses, British
couples fight over ancillary relief, in part because there are no hard and fast
rules about how assets should be divided.284 As described in the popular press,
“When a married couple separates, all property – whether jointly owned or not
– goes into one big pot of ‘marital assets’ to be divided up according to what
the couple (and their lawyers) agree is fair.”285
In the majority of divorce cases, British courts look at the financial need of
the parties.286 For those couples with more than a minimum of assets, judges
retain discretion as to the division of assets; however, there has been a
movement to a presumption of equality.287 In 2000, in White v. White, the Law
Lords stated that the starting position was an equal division of capital acquired
during marriage, regardless of its ownership.288 If a spouse wants an unequal
division of the matrimonial assets, that spouse must show that he or she made
an exceptional contribution to their acquisition.289 Baroness Brenda Hale, in
Miller v. Miller, concluded that it has become “less and less relevant to ask
who technically is the owner of what.”290 Therefore, tax-driven gifts might
also be accelerating the division that would ultimately be required by the

281. See DOUGLAS, supra note 268, at 210–12.
282. Id.
283. See id. at 188, 191.
284. DOUGLAS, supra note 268, at 190–93; Barlow, supra note 182, at 69; William Little,
Property and Divorce: How to Avoid the War of the Roses, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 23, 2008, 12:01
AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/property/3360512/Property-and-divorce-How-to-avoid-theWar-of-the-Roses.html#disqus_thread.
285. How Does Divorce Affect Property Ownership, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Dec. 12, 2007, 1:46
PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2007/dec/12/1.
286. See Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, c. 18, §§ 23–25 (Eng.); Ira Mark Ellman, Do
Americans Play Football?, 19 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 257, 260–61 (2005).
287. DOUGLAS, supra note 268, at 189–90.
288. [2001] 1 A.C. 596 (H.L.) 605 (appeal taken from Eng.). See also Miller v. Miller;
McFarlane v. McFarlane, [2006] UKHL 24 (H.L.) [16] (appeal taken from Eng.).
289. See Cowan v. Cowan [2001] EWCA (Civ) 679 [106], [2002] Fam. 97, 131 (Eng.);
Lambert v Lambert, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1685 [46], [2003] Fam. 103, 123 (Eng.) A.C.
290. Miller, [2006] UKHL at [123].
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family court upon divorce with the higher-income spouse losing control (if
control is given) before a divorce necessitates that outcome.
The U.S. should experience similar, if not greater, instances of income
shifting than have been witnessed in the U.K., similarly accelerating transfers
on death or divorce.291 In the period before the adoption of the incomesplitting joint return, when the U.S. had an individual-based system, one
commentator recognized that “[o]ne of the results of higher tax rates has been a
burst of generosity on the part of prosperous husbands.”292 More troublesome
for the tax system, many of those transfers worked for tax purposes but gave
wives little more than tax liability.293 In one early case before the New York
Court of Appeals, then-Judge Benjamin Cardozo complained that an
assignment of a lease and the profits that it generated to a spouse was “to lower
the plaintiff’s tax by taking income out of his return and adding it to the return
to be made by his wife. Beyond that, the relation was to be the same as it had
been.”294 The difficulty of auditing these types of transactions and the
resulting need to create default rules are as likely to trouble the U.S. as they do
the U.K., and at least some American states will likely alter their marital
property laws by adopting watered-down versions of community property
laws, as they did before 1948, to permit a state-wide division of income
without the need for individual devices.295 Because the author can only hazard
a guess at political responses, transfers of income-producing property will
likely happen in the U.S., but we cannot fully predict the extent to which
property and control over that property will be shifted.
The primary complicating factor for inter-spousal transfers, whether in the
U.K. or the U.S., is that ownership and control issues within marriage are
complex. Tax laws that promise tax reduction are unlikely sources for
producing true spousal equality in property ownership. As with expected
changes in wives’ paid employment, more information about the actual shifting
of property, and confirmation that control as well as the tax obligation is being
shifted, needs to be obtained before accurate calculations can be made about
this consequence. However, while dangers lurk and the results are difficult to
quantify, it is clear that individual taxation, properly policed, does encourage
the redistribution of property within marriage.

291. The author has found no research on the percentage of American wives holding property.
292. Robert M. Yoder, She’s Dear, But is She Deductible?, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Oct.
12, 1946, at 17, 141.
293. See Randolph E. Paul & Valentine B. Havens, Husband and Wife Under the Income Tax,
5 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 255 (1936).
294. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 549 (N.Y. 1928).
295. See McMahon, supra note 110.
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Tax Avoidance

The ability to shift income between spouses in different tax rate brackets,
and thereby to reduce collective taxes, not only increases the relative economic
position of British wives, but it also generates significant policing problems for
the government. To the extent the government desires that only substantive
changes in ownership produce favorable tax results, it needs to review the
substance of those transactions. This policing requires costly effort and creates
inequities between those caught devising sham transfers and those who
manage to avoid detection. British courts have already begun hearing cases in
which the HMRC contends that family income shifting constitutes tax
avoidance and, therefore, the desired tax reduction should be denied.296 This
section examines these costs associated with inter-spousal income shifting.
1.

Unavoidable Complexity

In the years leading up to the adoption of individual taxation, tax
avoidance in the U.K. was increasing.297 Trying to negate that avoidance, the
HMRC clawed back over £2 billion in unpaid taxes in 1988, compared to
£1.68 billion in 1987.298 Yet experts concluded that the HMRC was barely
scraping the surface of the tax-avoidance problem.299 The British government
recognizes there is a gap between what people pay in taxes and what the
government thinks they owe, estimated by the HMRC Revenue at £15 billion
annually, but it is difficult for the HMRC to find this lost revenue because
there are substantially fewer audits in the U.K. than in the U.S.300 It will
require a substantial infusion of resources to make this auditing possible, in
part because the British system is less efficient than its American
counterpart.301 The HMRC’s administrative costs, for example, are about 2%
of revenue collected, which is three or four times the comparable figure for the
I.R.S.302
While the U.K. recognizes that tax avoidance costs the government
significant revenue, Parliament has nevertheless been slow to act. If the
government attempts to police marital income shifting in order to distinguish
true transfers from shams or to assess the value of transferred interests, there
will need to be a significant revision of the existing simple regime to a more

296. See, e.g., Jones v. Garnett, [2007] UKHL 35, (H.L.) [1]–[2] (appeal taken from Eng.).
297. Peter Rodgers, Taxing Times for Fiddlers on the Hoof, GUARDIAN, Sept. 1, 1989, at 25.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, MEASURING TAX GAPS 2009 (2010); THURONYI, supra note
21, at 213.
301. See Gale, supra note 36, at 349–50.
302. Id. at 350.
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complex, American-style tax enforcement system.303 This flies in the face of
current British theory and policy objectives.304 As discussed in Part I, the
current British income tax has compromised in favor of simplicity even when
it frustrates the goals of accurately measuring income or the ability to pay
taxes.305 A statutory general anti-avoidance rule has been discussed but no
action taken because the British government is unsure if this new complexity
would be an improvement over tax avoidance.306 If there is increased tax
avoidance as couples develop new ways to shift income for tax purposes, the
U.K. will have a choice: either devote more resources to define and then police
avoidance behavior or ignore the avoidance behavior.
The British government has tried to use existing law to prevent the interspousal income shifting that occurs through family businesses, but it has failed.
The most notable case to date, Arctic Systems, resulted in a victory for married
couples and a substantial loss for the HMRC.307 The final decision ended a
seven-year standoff between the government and Geoff and Diana Jones, the
husband and wife owners of a small IT consulting firm, Arctic Systems Ltd.308
After being let go from his job, Geoff decided to go into business for himself
in 1992, two years after individual taxation was established.309 On the advice
of his accountants, the new company, owned equally by Geoff and Diana, paid
Geoff and Diana salaries: Geoff’s was below market for consulting work, and
Diana’s was for four or five hours per week of administrative and bookkeeping
work.310 After expenses and the corporate tax were deducted, the couple
received the remaining income as dividends, which under U.K. law still

303. As discussed supra, Part III.A.ii., transfers of income-producing property, if legitimate,
are recognized. The question is what constitutes a legitimate transfer.
304. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. The British government generally relies on
taxpayers to self-report tax advantages, imposing on taxpayers part of the cost of reducing
avoidance behavior. Lynne Oates & David Salter, Disclosure of Tax Avoidance Schemes—
Section 116 and Schedule 38, 2008 BRIT. TAX REV. 505, 505. Family income shifting does not
qualify under the rules provided for a reportable tax advantage. See Guidance, Disclosure of Tax
Avoidance Schemes, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, http://hmrc.gov.uk/aiu/suppguide.htm (last
visited Apr. 26, 2011) (outlining the hallmarks of transactions that must be disclosed).
305. See sources cited supra note 48 and accompanying text. The desire for simplicity means
it is unlikely that a standard to police avoidance, as opposed to rules, would be adopted in the
U.K.
306. THURONYI, supra note 21, at 185.
307. Jones v. Garnett (Arctic Systems), [2007] UKHL 35 (H.L.) [28]–[31] (appeal taken from
Eng.). See also Mr. P.A. Snell; Mrs. M. Snell v. Revenue & Customs Comm., [2008] S.T.C.
(SCD) 1094 (Eng.) (appeal dismissed); Campbell v. IRC, [2004] S.T.C. (SCD) 396 (Eng.).
308. Jones, [2007] UKHL at [3]–[4].
309. Id.
310. Id. Diana Jones did not argue that she was paid in recognition of services performed in
the home. See id. at [4].
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minimized income taxes and national insurance contributions.311 The
government challenged this tax plan, arguing that Geoff never would have
consented to transfer half of his business to a stranger under the same terms.312
Attempting to apply a provision of a 1930 law intended to prevent transfers to
minor children, the HMRC sought to tax all of the income generated by the
business to Geoff individually.313
The lower courts agreed with the HMRC, disallowing the tax advantage
from this planning.314 On appeal, however, although the Law Lords believed
that “[t]he decisions were tax driven and not commercially driven,” they
concluded that the inter-spousal arrangement fell within the exemption
provided for gifts between spouses.315 This dividend system had secured a
16% tax reduction for the Jones, and this benefit applied to a large number of
other couples’ dividend payment schemes.316 During one hearing, the taxpayer
argued that at least 200,000 families were potentially at risk of having their
tax-planning devices invalidated; the government countered that the number
was really closer to 30,000.317 Regardless of how many couples stood to
benefit, the Law Lords noted that gifts between spouses in the U.K. are not
taxed, and these arrangements were, therefore, given tax effect.318 Small
businesses rejoiced: the chairman of a group of such businesses hailed the
decision as “the best Christmas present for the U.K.’s small family
businesses.”319
The government was not satisfied with this result, and HM Treasury
sought its only recourse—to change the law. Treasury issued a written report
to Parliament in mid-2007, proposing broad rules that would affect many
limited companies and partnerships.320 If two or more “connected persons,”

311. Id. at [5].
312. Id. at [8]. One commentator pointed out that if Geoff and Diana divorced, Diana’s claim
to half of the business would be respected. Roger Kerridge, Note, Jones v. Garnett (Arctic
Systems): Another Way of Getting the Same Result, 2007 BRIT. TAX REV. 591, 595.
313. Jones, [2007] UKHL at [2]–[3]; Finance Act 1988, c. 4, § 660A (Eng.). See also
Kerridge, supra note 312, at 592.
314. Jones v. Garnett, [2005] STC (SCD) 9 (Eng.). See also Glen Loutzenhiser, Note, Jones
v. Garnett: High Court Gives Taxpayer the Cold Shoulder, 2005 BRIT. TAX REV. 401, 403.
315. Jones, [2007] UKHL at [4], [10].
316. Robert Lee, Lords Rules in Favour of Arctic Systems, TAX-NEWS.COM (July 27, 2007),
http://www.tax-news.com/news/Lords_Rules_In_Favour_Of_Arctic_Systems_27983.html.
317. Loutzenhiser, supra note 314, at 410.
318. Jones, [2007] UKHL at [26]. See also Kerridge, supra note 312, at 593.
319. Alex Hawkes, Arctic Systems: Timeline and Background on the Case, ACCOUNTANCY
AGE (Nov. 8, 2007), http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/specials/2149834/arcticsystems-geoff-diana.
320. HM TREASURY, INCOME SHIFTING: A CONSULTATION ON DRAFT LEGISLATION 11–12
(2007), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/consult_income_shifting.pdf. The prebudget reports are delivered every autumn to the Chancellor to the House of Commons. Pre-
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which includes spouses, are engaged in business and the income the business
produces is divided in a manner that produces a tax advantage, the division
could be recharacterized.321
[T]he Government believes it is unfair for one person to arrange their affairs so
that their income is diverted to a second person, subject to a lower tax rate, to
obtain a tax advantage (income shifting). The vast majority of individuals
cannot shift their income and income shifting runs counter to the principle of
322
independent taxation.

While the government indicated that it had no intention of attacking actual
transfers between spouses, for example gifts of income-producing property, it
found something fundamentally different in the business relationship of the
Joneses.323 Any arrangement like this, it felt, “minimises [sic.] their tax
liability, and results in an unfair outcome, increasing the tax burden on other
tax-payers and putting businesses that compete with these individuals at a
competitive disadvantage.”324 The Treasury then identified 85,000 small
family-run companies and partnerships with arrangements similar to the
Joneses.325 It estimated that the elimination of these arrangements would save
£200 million in administrative costs and prevent a tax loss of £350 million by
2010–2011.326 Moreover, the government estimated that as the number of
small businesses continues to increase, there will be more of these
opportunities to shift income.327
Drafting a workable solution proved difficult, however. There were many
attacks on the Treasury proposal as business groups rallied for its defeat.
Arguing that it would disadvantage family-run businesses and discourage
people from entering into business with anyone, spouses or not, pro-business
groups sought to protect the financial advantages individual taxation could

Budget Report, HM TREASURY, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/prebud_index.htm (last visited
Apr. 26, 2011).
321. See id.
322. HM TREASURY & HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, 2007 PRE-BUDGET REPORT AND
COMPREHENSIVE SPENDING REVIEW: PRESS NOTICES PN02 (2007), available at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/media/7/8/pbr_csr07_completepn.pdf.
323. “The legislation is not intended to apply to genuine commercial arrangements, broadly
where the share of overall income received by each individual is a fair and reasonable reflection
of what they would be entitled to in a normal commercial arrangement, or where there is no
overall tax advantage as a result of income shifting.” HM TREASURY, supra note 320, at 14.
324. 463 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2007) 89–90 (U.K.).
325. HM TREASURY, supra note 320, at 34; Richard Tyler, Arctic Systems and Income
Shifting a Year On, TELEGRAPH BLOG (July 21, 2008), http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/finance/
Richardtyler/4678027/Arctic_Systems_and_income_shifting_a_year_on.
326. HM TREASURY, supra note 320, at 34; Tyler, supra note 325.
327. HM TREASURY, supra note 320, at 3.
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provide.328 The Professional Contractors Group, who helped fund the Arctic
Systems litigation, would not accept the “income shifting” label, arguing that
for some years the government itself had recommended that businesses be set
up jointly.329 At least one pro-business organization “recognise[d] the
Government’s concern, and [] accept[ed] that income-shifting is a legitimate
area in which to seek policy changes where there is clear abuse”; however, it
doubted that there was any “principled way of drawing a boundary between
abusive and non-abusive tax planning in this area. . . . There is no point at all
in asking the owners of small businesses to self-assess whether arrangements
of the type with which this proposed legislation is concerned are arm’slength.”330
Illustrating the growing power of British interest groups, last minute
lobbying prompted the Chancellor to postpone the rule changes in favor of
more extensive consultation.331 Consequently, the final result after Arctic
Systems remains uncertain. As it stands, these dividend-sharing arrangements
effectively reduce a couple’s collective income taxes while the government
continues to consult on this issue. Given the many other economic issues
facing the U.K. today, the Treasury is unlikely to take action any time soon. It
did not bring forward legislation on this topic in the 2010 finance bill.332 The
alternatives remain open: Parliament can pass a law moving to a more
American-type, complex tax regime, allowing HMRC to police incomeshifting behavior in order to evaluate on a case-by-case basis whether income
has been unacceptably shifted by one spouse to gain a tax advantage, or

328. See, e.g., CHARTERED INST. OF TAXATION, INCOME SHIFTING: A CONSULTATION ON
DRAFT LEGISLATION 2 (2008), available at http://www.tax.org.uk/showarticle.pl?ft=;id=6578;
n=0;p=1; INST. OF DIRS., INCOME SHIFTING: A CONSULTATION ON DRAFT LEGISLATION 1–4
(2008); INST. OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN ENG. & WALES, TAX GUIDE, TAX FACULTY,
INCOME SHIFTING: GUIDANCE ON DRAFT LEGISLATION 3 (2007), available at
http://www.icaew.com/index.cfm/route/153290/icaew_ga/en/Technical_and_Business_Topics/Fa
culties/News/Guidance_on_draft_income_shifting_legislation; PFK ACCOUNTANTS & BUS.
ADVISERS, INCOME SHIFTING: A CONSULTATION ON DRAFT LEGISLATION RESPONSE BY PKF
(UK) LLP 1 (2008), available at http://www.pkf.co.uk/pkf/download/business_tax/income_
shifting_consultation_pkf; PROF’L CONTRACTORS GRP., RESPONSE TO THE CONSULTATION ON
“INCOME SHIFTING” DRAFT LEGISLATION 1 (2008), available at http://www.pcg.org.uk/cms/
index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=665&Itemid=1093.
329. PROF’L CONTRACTORS GRP., supra note 328, at 6.
330. INST. OF DIRS., supra note 328, at 1, 4.
331. Tyler, supra note 325.
332. Finance Act 2010, c. 13 (U.K.). The government deferred action in 2009. HM
TREASURY, BUDGET 2009: BUILDING BRITAIN’S FUTURE, 2009, H.C. 407-I, at 154 (U.K.),
available at http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/menu/com2008.htm. As in the U.S., the focus
has largely moved to offshore tax avoidance.
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Parliament can allow Arctic Systems to stand and concede income shifting as
couples desire.333
For all of its more complicated tax regime, we should not assume that the
American system will be in a significantly better position to limit this type of
tax avoidance, particularly as there is the possibility that all transfers of
property between spouses, many of which are accepted by the British
government, will be viewed as avoidance in the U.S., as they are in Canada.
Moreover, even if one concedes—although this author is reluctant to do so—
that the existing Internal Revenue Code could target every device wealthy
spouses will use to shift taxable income, but not control over the underlying
property, invalid transfers will still need to be caught. The I.R.S. is struggling
to restrain today’s tax avoidance and surely will have even more trouble with
the detailed and complicated avoidance that might be perpetrated within
Facially-valid avoidance devices like income-shifting
couples.334
arrangements will be difficult to detect, much less successfully prosecute.
Economic pressure placed on the I.R.S. to prioritize enforcement of certain
matters has already reduced enforcement in areas ripe for exploitation by
income shifting.335
Perhaps more difficult to resolve, Congress will need to devise rules to
reconcile individual taxation with the social provisions included in the
American income tax. For example, rules will need to be created to deal with
the income phase-outs applicable to many deductions and credits. To continue
to base these tax expenditures on a family’s aggregate income will be difficult
to administer, but to allow each spouse to calculate them separately would
sometimes produce incongruous results. Couples where the wealthy spouse
refuses to, or is unable to, shift income to their lower-income spouse might
enjoy tax benefits like the Earned Income Tax Credit, higher Child Care
Credits, and more. While this might be an intentional result, these
333. As of 2005, Parliament requires an outright gift not subject to conditions in order to
secure tax-free treatment. Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act, 2005, c. 5, § 626 (U.K.).
334. See McMahon, supra note 113; Theodore P. Seto, The Unintended Tax Advantages of
Gay Marriage, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1529 (2008). For a discussion of American tax
enforcement, see James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 818, 818–19
(1998) (analyzing the nature of tax enforcement and the structure of the I.R.S.); Steve Johnson,
The 1998 Act and the Resources Link Between Tax Compliance and Tax Simplification, 51 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1013 (2003) (arguing that simplifying the tax code would lead to increased tax
compliance); Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 U. KAN. L. REV.
971, 982 (2003) (concluding that the IRS’s softer approach has not netted increases in tax
compliance); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1781 (2000) (examining the norms underlying American tax compliance and noncompliance behavior); David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths about Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215
(2002) (observing that no one change to the I.R.C. will eliminate the problem of tax shelters).
335. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FY 2010 BUDGET IN BRIEF 9, 60 (2009); IRS
OVERSIGHT BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2008, at 25–31 (2009).
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distributional and revenue effects should be included in our evaluation of
individual taxation.
A similar concern involves the allocation of such social provisions. The
British system has devised differing rules for allocating its various social
provisions between spouses, although their administration should be easier
because there are fewer such provisions in the U.K.’s tax. The British
Children’s Tax Credit, calculated on a couple’s combined income, is allocated
to the spouse who has income in higher tax brackets.336 If neither spouse has
income above the basic tax rate, they may share or allocate the credit as they
desire.337 Similarly, before the mortgage interest deduction was repealed, the
system allowed spouses to choose how to allocate it, providing even more
flexibility.338 The deduction was not tied to which spouse actually paid the
interest, although either spouse could withdraw their consent to the
allocation.339 This flexibility is not available for all British credits. The Blind
Person’s Allowance must first be applied against the total of the blind person’s
income before the excess can be transferred to a spouse or civil partner.340
With many possible permutations of allocation available, American
policymakers would have to decide whether to follow one of these paths for
each credit or deduction granted.
These issues will inevitably create additional complexities in the tax
system as taxpayers attempt to use the system to reduce their own tax burdens.
Both the U.K. and the U.S. already struggle with tax avoidance and, in light of
individual taxation’s opportunities for increased avoidance, many of which
will be substantial, evaluating the adoption of this regime should take into
account the government’s and taxpayers’ logistical and financial constraints
and responses.341 The U.K. has begun to recognize the difficulty of removing

336. Tax Credits, Child Benefit and Guardian’s Allowance, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS,
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/rates/taxcredits.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2011).
337. Id.
338. IN1120—Interest Relief (2009), HM TREASURY, INDEPENDENT TAXATION MANUAL,
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/Inmanual/html/In0990/15_0041_IN1120.htm.
339. Id. If adopted in the U.S., this might encourage the sharing of financial information
between spouses or, as the author suspects, the spouse in charge of financial affairs will make this
determination for the couple.
340. See Blind Person’s Allowance, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/
incometax/blind-person-allow.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2011).
341. Leslie Book has argued, “policymakers concerned with cheating should pay closer
attention to structural incentives and the relative ease in which individuals’ non-compliance falls
outside the light of day.” Leslie Book, Freakonomics and the Tax Gap: An Applied Perspective,
56 AM. U. L. REV. 1163, 1167 (2007). See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 334, at 1039–44 (examining
the success of structural change components of the Revenue Reform Act); Leandra Lederman,
Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695
(2007) (advocating using third parties as a compliance tool); Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy
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tax benefits once they have been enjoyed.342 Unless the U.S. takes action to
prevent similar results before it adopts individual taxation, it will be in no
better position to eliminate the advantages once created, even as it struggles to
devise new rules for the operation of existing tax policies.
2.

Ignoring Bad Behavior

With individual taxation in place, the British government retains a choice,
but one that it does not want to make. It can police inter-spousal income
shifting at the cost discussed above, or it can grant tax reduction to all—even
incomplete and entirely tax-driven—transfers of property, either by issuing a
directive to that effect or by simply ignoring the behavior. This latter option
would likely be based on the hope that existing rules prohibiting spouses, as
connected persons, from engaging in certain obvious tax avoidance
transactions are sufficient to police most avoidance behavior or that even
purely tax-driven transactions will result in at least some property ending up in
the hands of the nation’s wives.343 Parliament should be aware that if income
shifting is permitted as a result of either of these approaches, it will have
certain negative unintended consequences.
First, even if the British population concludes that the beneficial
consequences of income shifting should override all else, this tax avoidance
will decrease the taxes paid by those engaging in income shifting by
decreasing the collective taxes that these married couples owe.344 The British
public is aware of this result as a strategy, but it is unclear whether they are
aware of its larger implications.345 Married couples are openly advised to

Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1267, 1290 (arguing for a simplified tax system
and considering why there is resistance to the idea).
342. James Chapman, Cameron: I Don’t Need a Coalition: Tories Would “Dare” Lib Dems
to Vote Down Their Budget, MAILONLINE (May 3, 2010, 10:39 AM), http://www.daily
mail.co.uk/news/election/article-1270459/David-Cameron-admits-facing-difficult-toughdecisions-spending-cuts-plug-163bn-deficit.html (noting that on the eve of the last Prime Minister
election, politicians were trying to reassure citizens that budget cuts would not remove tax credits
for children, schools, or hospitals).
343. IN8—Rules that do Not Change, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/
manuals/inmanual/in8.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
344. Individual taxation, to the extent it lowers the taxation of married couples and
necessitates increases in tax rates, will disadvantage those in relatively greater need. One-parent
families, largely composed of women and children, constitute one of most rapidly-growing family
types. Hilary Winchester, Women and Children Last: The Poverty and Marginalization of OneParent Families, 70 TRANSACTIONS OF THE INST. OF BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 70, 70 (1990). In
Britain this group is extremely marginalized. Id. at 81. In the U.S., individual taxation might
deprive this group of existing head of household benefits.
345. The most troubling aspect of the Arctic Systems income shifting might be the conversion
of wage income to dividends which allows former employees to minimize their contributions to
the health care system. CLAIRE CRAWFORD & JUDITH FREEDMAN, INST. FOR FISCAL STUD.,
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decrease the amount they must contribute to the government by shifting
property and the income it generates, but it is unclear whether people are aware
that the combined result of these individual activities is estimated at £350
million annually.346
That income shifting decreases tax revenue also means that evidence of
this behavior, even when the behavior is not undertaken for tax avoidance
purposes, might become newsworthy. In fact, the argument that all income
shifting constitutes tax avoidance quickly proved valuable as political
ammunition. In May 1995, Labour seized upon news that leaders of the
National Grid, the company that operates the national gas transmission system
throughout Great Britain, “had avoided tax by transferring share options to
their wives.”347 As Prime Minister Tony Blair told the House of Commons,
“The only reason why they transfer it to their spouses is because the
renumeration [sic] is paid by way of share options to avoid income tax. That’s
why they do it. That’s the issue.”348 Similarly, Adam Inram, former Labour
defense minister, earning more than £115,000 from outside business interests,
recently made the news when he failed to declare a family firm that could be
used in this manner to avoid tax.349 How the public perceives this form of
avoidance, and the degree to which they are willing to accept it, will play a part
in the amount of damage it might do to the tax system as a whole.
The largest threat to the system might not be the revenue lost directly from
income shifting but, instead, the publicity it receives which tacitly encourages
other avoidance. Scholars have warned that if tax avoidance becomes part of
everyday life, it will erode the U.K.’s tax-compliant culture.350 As studies in
other contexts have shown, the perception of widespread tax avoidance often
reduces the compliance of taxpayers who were not previously engaging in tax
avoidance because they begin to perceive the system as unfair.351 The U.S.

SMALL BUSINESS TAXATION 18 (2008); Anne Redston, Small Business in the Eye of the Storm,
2004 BRIT. TAX REV. 566, 569–71 (2004).
346. See, e.g., HM TREASURY, supra note 320, at 34; Plotting That Tax Labyrinth, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 4, 1997, at WEEKEND MONEY 5.
347. Roger Cowe, Labour’s Tax Crusade Falters, GUARDIAN, Dec. 10, 1997, at 12.
348. Id.
349. Jonathan Oliver & Georgia Warren, Ex-Minister Fails to Declare Family Firm, SUNDAY
TIMES (London), Mar. 29, 2009, at 8.
350. Redston, supra note 345, at 580. See also KAY & KING, supra note 146, at 44.
351. See IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 335, at 19 (finding it is important to taxpayers
that the I.R.S. fairly enforce tax laws); Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and
Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1497–99 (2003) (stating that punishing
free-riders in the context of public goods may help maintain voluntary contributions); Redston,
supra note 345, at 580 (quoting Simon McKie’s statement that it takes decades to convince
people a system is fair and thereby get them to follow the rules); Steven M. Sheffrin & Robert K.
Triest, Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in Compliance, in WHY
PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 193, 194–95 (Joel Slemrod ed.,
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government has found evidence that publicity of wealthy taxpayers’ successful
attempts to avoid their “fair share” of federal taxes undermines compliance
throughout the income spectrum.352 When people believe that others have
manipulated the income tax regime, normally compliant taxpayers are tempted
to do so as well.353 The U.K. already has lower tax morale than does the U.S.,
so giving taxpayers additional motivation to avoid taxes could prove quite
damaging.354
These potential reductions in revenue, both directly and through the
erosion of taxpayer compliance, will damage the U.K.’s budget if receipt of the
tax revenue has been assumed. In that case, the money will have to be found
somewhere else, either by increasing taxes or by borrowing. Neither option is
attractive, particularly during this economic downturn. To increase income tax
rates will disproportionately affect those who choose not to, or are unable to,
engage in tax avoidance. Alternatively, Parliament could increase other taxes.
The most likely candidates would be increasing the British VAT, recently
raised to 20% effective in 2011, or by increasing excise taxes.355 These
regressive taxes currently fund a quarter of the nation’s revenue.356 These
alternatives will, in turn, produce new behavior of their own as taxpayers
respond to the changing tax circumstances.
Of course, this problem is not unique to the U.K. or to individual taxation.
To the extent that any tax provision provides taxpayers means to reduce their
individual burdens, it runs the risk of requiring that the government increase
tax revenue from other sources. The HMRC estimates that billions are lost
every year because taxpayers evade the income tax; only part of that evasion
comes from what the HMRC sees as impermissible income shifting.357
Similarly, the U.S., without this opportunity for avoidance via income shifting,
reports a $345 billion gross tax gap.358 Income shifting would likely increase
this amount. When the U.S. had individual taxation, President Franklin D.
1992) (noting that perception of general tax compliance is important to individual compliance
decisions). See also sources cited supra notes 261, 267.
352. IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 335, at 19. See also Tax Fairness: Policy and
Enforcement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. & Gen. Gov’t of the H. Comm. on
Appropriations, 110th Cong. 2 (2007) (written statement of Nina E. Olson, National Taxpayer
Advocate), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/nta_testimony_houseapprops_030507_
v7.pdf; 153 CONG. REC. D260 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 2007).
353. See IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 335, at 19; Redston, supra note 345, at 580.
354. See Alm & Torgler, supra note 36, at 239.
355. HM TREASURY, BUDGET 2010, at 18 (2010), available at http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/
Nl1/Newsroom/Budget/Budget2010/DG_188496.
356. OFFICE FOR NAT’L STAT., supra note 29, at 365.
357. See LORD GRABINER QC, HM TREASURY, THE INFORMAL ECONOMY ii, 1–5 (2000),
available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/docs/2000/grabiner.html.
358. OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY
FOR REDUCING THE TAX GAP 5 (2006); IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 335, at 17.
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Roosevelt reported that one family had established 197 trusts to divide family
income and have it taxed at lower rates and that gifts were used to reduce a
$100 million estate to $8 million two years prior to one man’s death.359
Similarly, Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,
complained that one resident of Baltimore, Maryland, established sixty-four
trusts for his wife and three children and thereby saved over $485,000 in
federal income taxes in one year.360
On the other hand, individual taxation might decrease some costs of
administering the American income tax. If Congress uses the adoption of
individual taxation as an opportunity to eliminate the innocent spouse rules that
mitigate joint and several liability for those filing joint tax returns, it would
save a significant amount of government revenue.361 After Congress
liberalized innocent spouse relief in 1998, the Commissioner estimated that
27,000 claims for relief were made the first year.362 In other years there have
been as many as 57,000 claims.363 These claims must be reviewed and are
often litigated.364 Innocent spouse relief was listed as one of the ten most
litigated tax issues for 2010.365 These provisions thus command a considerable
amount of government resources, even though taxpayers prevail even in part
359. Press Conference Number 225 July 31, 1935, in 6 COMPLETE PRESIDENTIAL PRESS
CONFERENCES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 64, 67, 69 (Da Capo Press 1972) (1935).
360. JOHN MORTON BLUM, FROM THE MORGENTHAU DIARIES: YEARS OF CRISIS, 1928–1938
330 (2d prtg. 1959).
361. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 1 2009 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 497–506
(2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/mostlitigatedissues_2010arc.pdf. Scholars
who criticize joint and several liability tend to do so for reasons other than its cost. See generally
Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Taxation Domestic Relations Comm., Report, Comments on Liability
of Divorced Spouses for Tax Deficiencies on Previously Filed Joint Returns, 50 TAX LAW. 395
(1997) (proposing eliminating the innocent spouse defense and attributing liability to the spouse
to whom the income in question was attributable); Richard C.E. Beck, The Innocent Spouse
Problem: Joint and Several Liability for Income Taxes Should Be Repealed, 43 VAND. L. REV.
317 (1990) (arguing joint and several liability is unjust and should be repealed); Amy C.
Christian, Joint and Several Liability and the Joint Return: Its Implication for Women, 66 U. CIN.
L. REV. 535 (1998) (arguing joint and several liability is facially inequitable); Lily Kahng,
Innocent Spouses: A Critique of the New Tax Laws Governing Joint and Several Tax Liability, 49
VILL. L. REV. 261 (2004) (presenting a structure for implementing innocent spouse rules); Kari
Smoker, Comment, Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998: Expanded
Relief for Innocent Spouses—At What Cost? A Feminist Perspective, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 2045
(1999) (arguing the innocent spouse rules reinforce social stereotypes of women as victims).
362. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, §
3201, 112 Stat. 685, 734 (1998) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6015); Amy Hamilton, Lawmakers
Track IRS Reform One Year Later, 84 TAX NOTES 517, 519 (1999).
363. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-558, TAX ADMINISTRATION: IRS’S
INNOCENT SPOUSE PROGRAM PERFORMANCE IMPROVED; BALANCED PERFORMANCE MEASURES
NEEDED 15 tbl.4 (2002), available at http://gao.gov/products/GAO-02-558.
364. See id. at 14–15.
365. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 414 (2010).
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only 38.9% of the time.366 These costs might be reduced, if not eliminated,
with the switch to individual taxation.367
This existence in the U.S. of potentially-offsetting financial benefits from
individual taxation complicates the assessment of its impact on government
revenue. To the extent the change in tax unit decreases British or American
government revenue, it has far-reaching and troubling consequences, many of
which were not, and are not, considered during debates over the conversion to
individual taxation. As shown by this section, these unintended consequences
are complex. It is difficult to determine the full costs of these consequences in
the U.K., and even harder to anticipate all of the ramifications in the U.S. of a
change in law. This Article is an attempt to begin identifying potential
consequences in the U.S. because, despite the analytical difficulty, we must do
so if we want to evaluate this proposal intelligently.
CONCLUSION
The U.K. has often provided examples to the U.S. of progressive policy
development.368 From Britain’s earlier women’s movement to individual
taxation, the U.S. can look across the Atlantic for a guide to changing many
different types of laws. Sometimes, however, the guidance is also a warning.
The British experience with individual taxation, for example, provides a
cautionary tale for the U.S. There are significant complications and unfulfilled
hopes that arise from the individual regime that need to be considered before
changing the American tax unit. This is true even if adopting individual
taxation proves to be the best choice. Individual taxation might afford a more
complete sense of equality between the sexes, including reducing indirect
sources of inequality, but it also provides a source of tax reduction for an
already-benefited group.369 Only when these negative results are considered in
conjunction with the expected benefits of the changed tax unit can
governments accurately assess the value of altering the tax regime.
The decision to adopt individual taxation is, therefore, more than a simple
decision of whether or not marriage deserves recognition in the tax system.

366. See id. at 417 tbl.3.0.2.
367. The author is working on a paper questioning the justness of eliminating joint and
several liability. If we worry that the current system that for better or worse recognizes that wives
are often in marital positions of weakness and dependence does not properly recognize the plight
of wives, we should not expect a system in which the underlying theory is that wives are
independent and not liable for anything but their own income to be more sympathetic.
368. See, e.g., SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 78–79 (noting the adoption of a child tax credit
system in 1799); Mehrotra, supra note 13, at 213 (discussing the implementation of the British
excess profits tax in the early twentieth century).
369. See supra notes 2, 4, 21, 187–91, 230 and accompanying text. Indirect inequality is
discussed, for example, in Catherine Barnard & Bob Hepple, Substantive Equality, 59
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 562 (2000).
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Instead, it requires deciding how to allocate a tax reduction among various
family types. Unfortunately, when deciding the best tax unit, there is no
choice that simply removes distortions in behavior. Each choice always
benefits some family arrangement.370 When the U.K. changed its tax unit, it
expected to help one-earner families and encourage that family structure, and
the new regime has provided many of its economic rewards to those families.
If the U.S. has other goals—for example to provide economic rewards to twoearner couples or to eliminate rewards based on marital status—it needs to
draw lessons from the U.K.’s results. The American government should not
expect different results from similar actions. If results similar to the British
goals are the real intent, American voters should be forewarned.
These repercussions of individual taxation do not seem to be getting
sufficient examination or reevaluation in either country. One reason might be
the relatively weak position of wives in each society.371 Women today, as in
the past, are seeking economic independence, and poverty remains a women’s
issue.372 In 2009, American women were 35% more likely to be poor and 37%
more likely to live in deep poverty than men.373 In the U.K, the Women’s
Budget Group has identified British women as being disproportionately poor;
in 2007–2008, women comprised almost 44% of taxpayers, but only 22% of
taxpayers with total income over £30,000.374 Their representation declines at
higher income levels.375 Thus, women’s economic independence in Britain
does not seem to be increasing, and those seeking to help them might be
willing to try almost any measure to change this.
Although, as shown in this article, individual taxation is not a panacea to
wives’ inequality, those who currently oppose the regime in the U.K. are doing
so for reasons other than its unintended consequences. Most objections to

370. The federal income tax system has historically had competing objectives: treating all
taxpayers in the same economic position the same way regardless of their marital status (i.e.,
horizontal equity which may in itself be difficult to define, let alone achieve) and taxing everyone
according to their ability to pay (i.e., progressive taxation). The system cannot accomplish these
goals at the same time. Bittker, supra note 2, at 1396–97.
371. For example, in the U.K., the extent of, or lack of, women’s political power remains a
cause of concern. See generally Joni Lovenduski, Women and Politics: Minority Representation
or Critical Mass?, 54 PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 743, 744 (2001).
372. Lister, supra note 174, at 180–91.
373. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in
the United States (Sept. 10, 2009), available at http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/
archives/income_wealth/cb09-141.html.
374. HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, INCOME TAX BY GENDER, REGION AND COUNTRY 2007–
2008 1 (2010), available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/income_distribution/menu-by-year.htm
#311. Unfortunately, these statistics do not reflect the marital status of the individuals. For a
thorough review of the economic status of British women, see WOMEN’S BUDGET GRP.,
WOMEN’S & CHILDREN’S POVERTY: MAKING THE LINKS (2005).
375. Id.
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individual taxation have been made by those advocating on other issues. For
example, some advocates of tax reduction advocate joint taxation as a means to
lower tax rates.376 Similarly, the Chancellor has discussed replacing the family
credit with an in-work low income tax credit to encourage paid employment,
and it would likely mean a return to joint taxation after integrating the welfare
These other concerns, though not unworthy of
and tax systems.377
consideration, may someday bring the end of individual taxation without
provoking vigorous debate over its value. Much as individual taxation should
only be adopted after considering the system’s adverse effects, the experiment
should only be jettisoned after recognizing that its benefits will also be lost.
Thus, deep thought needs to be given in both countries to the pros and cons
of individual taxation, sooner rather than later. The benefits and disadvantages
of individual taxation might be clearer after a regime change has been made,
but it is hard to overcome the inertia created once the new regime is in place.
Evaluating other nations’ results might allow the U.S. more complete
consideration without entrenching the policy itself. As shown throughout this
article, American policymakers should be considering a significant number of
intended and unintended consequences likely to result from adopting
individual taxation, not in the least because it will be hard to eliminate
consequences that benefit a group of taxpayers once a new policy is enacted.
If the U.S. wants to aid two-earner families, as most scholars claim to, the
government might consider adopting individual taxation of earned but not
unearned income, as operated in the U.K. before the 1988 legislative change.378
This regime would be far from perfect and would impose administrative costs
on taxpayers, create opportunities for abuse (although certainly not as many
opportunities as with a completely individual-based system), and, as argued in
the U.K., discriminate against wives who generate unearned income.
Nevertheless, this bifurcated system would more narrowly target American
scholars’ complaints than would a complete individual-based regime.
While this Article has drawn many conclusions that policymakers should
consider before adopting individual taxation, it leaves unanswered one
significant question. That is, why, as the U.K. continues its two decade-long
experiment with the individual tax unit, the American government and its
scholars have not examined the British experience when they debate changing
the American tax unit. Not only does it bode poorly for our consideration of
this particular policy, but it also bodes ill for what we might be missing on

376. Carole Pateman, Beyond the Sexual Contract, in REWRITING THE SEXUAL CONTRACT,
supra note 118, at 1, 8.
377. Lister, supra note 174, at 188–89.
378. The author thinks there are other problems with taking this approach. See McMahon,
supra note 110. Re-adopting a two-earner deduction might better target this group.
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other issues by not looking at other nations as models. We should be willing to
learn from other nations’ successes and their mistakes.

